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1 Introduction
Existence and efficiency of equilibria in markets with asymmetric information
have been studied in great depth ever since the seminal Akerlof (1970) article.
Whether asymmetric information per se has a strong impact on market equilib-
ria thereby crucially depends on whether the asymmetry of information pertains
to private or, as in Akerlof (1970), common values. When values are private,
that is when the payoff that the uninformed party receives from a given contract
does not depend on the other party’s private information, competitive equilib-
ria exist and are efficient under fairly mild assumptions.1 However, in markets
with common values, a competitive equilibrium might not exist at all. This is
the result in the famous Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive
insurance markets with adverse selection. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show
that when insurers offer contracts to consumers that have private information
about their risk type which is payoff-relevant for a given insurance contract,
an equilibrium in pure strategies might fail to exist: If the share of low risks
is high, a profitable pooling contract would be preferred by both high and low
risk types over the candidate separating, zero-profit-making Rothschild-Stiglitz
(RS) contracts. However, a pooling contract cannot be tendered in equilibrium
as insurers would try to cream skim low risks.
This equilibrium nonexistence result is not merely a theoretical oddity. In fact,
equilibrium nonexistence is sometimes brought forward as an efficiency reason
for regulation of insurance markets, notably social insurance. However, equilib-
rium inexistence itself is not a sensible reason to call for regulation: It cannot
1 See Pouyet, Salanie´, and Salanie´ (2008). An earlier work with more restrictive assumptions
is Fagart (1996).
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be determined whether regulation, resulting in a particular market allocation,
improves efficiency in a market where it is not even clear what the market allo-
cation is without regulation. Rather, the equilibrium inexistence result points
out that it is necessary to examine whether the RS model is the correct model to
describe behavior in insurance markets and consequently to think of alternative
models. Whether adverse selection provides an efficiency reason for regulation
might then be determined based on equilibrium properties in these alternative
models.
Not surprisingly, the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) result has spurred exten-
sive research. In chapter 2, the nonexistence problem and ensuing debate is
reviewed in more detail. In terms of the resulting market allocation, the con-
tributions following RS can with a few exceptions be classified in two broad
categories: Models that yield the RS allocation, even for the case in which
there is no equilibrium in the original RS model, and models that yield the
so-called Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) allocation. The crucial difference be-
tween these allocations is that the RS allocation is only second-best efficient if
an equilibrium exists in the original RS model, whereas the WMS allocation
is generally second-best efficient. Thus, there is an efficiency reason for reg-
ulation due to adverse selection if insurance markets are considered correctly
captured in models of the first, but not the second class. However, although
several modifications to the RS model have been brought forward, there is still
no generally agreed upon solution. This is because proposed solutions either
lack sound game-theoretic foundation, introduce somewhat arbitrary changes
to the RS model or impose exogenous constraints. Chapters 3 and 4 therefore
propose solutions to the RS puzzle that tackle these problems.
The third chapter introduces a dynamic model that allows insurers to with-
draw contracts in reaction to their competitors.2 This is the logic suggested in
2 The model in this chapter is joint work with Achim Wambach. An earlier version was
presented at the following conferences: 36th Conference of the European Association for
Research in Industrial Economics (Ljubljana, Slowenia, 2009), XIV. Spring Meeting of
Young Economists (Istanbul, Turkey, 2009), 24th Annual Meeting of the European Eco-
nomic Assocation (Barcelona, Spain, 2009), Annual Meeting of the European Group of
Risk and Insurance Economists (Bergen, Norway, 2009), Annual Meeting of the German
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Wilson (1977)’s “anticipatory equilibrium concept” that, in spite of departing
from Nash equilibrium, to date is one of the most appealed to solutions. In our
model an equilibrium with the WMS allocation always exists, thus providing a
game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson (1977) equilibrium. However, jointly
profit-making contracts can as well be sustained in equilibrium. We then allow
for entry and show that the WMS allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation
under entry.
In the fourth chapter we endogenize insurer capital: Instead of being assumed
to be exogenously endowed with large financial assets as in the RS model, in-
surers can choose their level of capital and consequently go insolvent.3 With
this endogenous insolvency risk, an equilibrium with the WMS allocation always
exists. Interestingly, solvency regulation might have unintended consequences
as strong capital requirements impede the existence of a second-best efficient
equilibrium.
Whereas the consequences of asymmetric information on competition in insur-
ance markets with adverse selection have thus been thoroughly analyzed, little
is known about the impact of asymmetric information on oligopoly behavior.4
In the fifth chapter we therefore depart from the assumption of competition and
analyze the impact of asymmetric information on the ability of insurance firms
to collude.5 As insurance markets tend to be highly concentrated and there
have been several antitrust cases, notably the recent German case in which 17
insurers for industrial insurance were fined € 140 million in 2010 on the grounds
of collusive behavior, an analysis of factors that influence collusion in insurance
markets seems warranted.6 It is shown that asymmetric information destabi-
Economic Association (Magdeburg, Germany, 2009).
3 The model in this chapter is joint work with Achim Wambach. An earlier version of
the model was presented at the following conferences: 10th Econometric Society World
Congress (Shanghai, China, 2010), 25th Annual Meeting of the European Economic Asso-
cation (Glasgow, UK, 2010), World Risk and Insurance Economics Conference (Singapore,
2010), Annual Meeting of the German Association for insurance science (Du¨sseldorf, Ger-
many, 2010).
4 An exception is Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez (2007) in which horizontally differentiated
health plans are considered.
5 The model in this chaper is joint work with Alexander Rasch.
6 According to Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005), concentration indices for the top 5 insurance
companies in non-life business in Europe range from 27 % in Germany to 89% in Finland.
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lizes collusion, however, this is not a result of asymmetric information per se,
but stems from the common value property of the market. Thus, on a general
note, we identify a new factor that destabilizes collusion: payoff-relevant private
information.
2 Competitive Insurance
Markets with Adverse
Selection
This chapter lays out the Rothschild-Stiglitz model and discusses the literature
on existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Besides the Rothschild-Stiglitz con-
tracts, the Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence contracts are introduced.
2.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz model
In their seminal work on competition in adverse selection insurance markets,
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (hereafter RS) analyze the market by defining a
particular notion of equilibrium. In this section, we spell out the game behind
the analysis in RS. While RS consider single contract offers by firms, we allow
insurers to offer contract menus. Consider the following game:
There is a continuum of individuals with mass 1. Each individual faces two possi-
ble states of nature: In state 1, no loss occurs and the endowment is w01, in state
2 a loss occurs and the endowment is w02 with w01 > w02 > 0. There are two
types of individuals, an individual may be a high risk type (H) with loss proba-
bility pH , or a low-risk type (L) with loss probability pL, with 0 < pL < pH < 1.
Insurance is provided by firms in the set F := {1, ..., f, ...n}. Firms do not
know, ex ante, any individual’s type. If an individual buys insurance, then the
endowment ω0 = (w01, w02) is traded for another state-contingent endowment
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ω = (w1, w2), we say the individual buys insurance contract ω. The set of fea-
sible contracts, Ω, is given by Ω := {(w1, w2) |(w1 ≥ w2 > 0} where w1 < w2 is
ruled out for moral hazard considerations.
The expected utility of a J-type individual, J ∈ {H,L} from chosing a contract
ω ∈ Ω is abbreviated by uJ(ω) := (1− pJ)v(w1) + p
Jv(w2) where v is a strictly
increasing, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. Note that, since consumers only differ in risk, the
single-crossing property holds naturally as (1−p
L)v′(w1)
pLv′(w2)
> (1−p
H)v′(w1)
pHv′(w2)
.7
The RS model is a screening game, i.e. the timing is the following:
Stage 0: The risk type of each individual is chosen by nature. Each individ-
ual has a chance of γ, 0 < γ < 1 to be a H-type, and of (1−γ) to be a L-type.
Stage 1: Each firm f ∈ F offers a finite set of contracts Ωf ⊂ Ω.
Stage 2: Individuals choose an insurance contract among offered contracts.8
In this game, the only candidate equilibrium contracts are separating and sep-
arately zero-profit making. In particular, candidate equilibrium contracts are
such that the high risk type is fully insured at her fair premium, and the low
risk type is partially insured at her respective fair premium such that contracts
are incentive compatible. These contracts are the famous Rothschild-Stiglitz
contracts, shown below in Figure 2.1. The straight lines correspond to the H-
type and L-type fair insurance contracts with the dashed one indicating the fair
insurance contracts for an average risk.
The intuition why an equilibrium in pure strategies, if it exists, yields the RS al-
7 Wambach (2000), Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) introduce an additional dimension
of asymmetric information by assuming that consumers furthermore differ in wealth/risk
aversion. With two dimensions of asymmetric information, the single crossing property
may be violated. Wambach (2000), Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) all consider single
contract offers and show that due to violation of single crossing there might be contracts
with positive profits offered in equilibrium. However, Snow (2009) argues that this is
simply a consequence of restricting insurer strategies to single contract offers as contracts
with positive profits cannot be tendered in equilibrium when contract menus can be offered.
8 Insurance purchase is exclusive, i.e. a consumer is assumed to buy at most one insurance
contract at one firm.
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w2
w1
uL
uH
ωHRS
ωLRS
Figure 2.1: RS contracts
location, is the following: Pooling cannot be an equilibrium, as for any possible
pooling contract that yields nonnegative profits on the whole population, a prof-
itable deviation exists in either attracting all customers, if profits on each type
in the pooling contract are positive, or cream-skimming low risks, if high risks
are cross-subsidized. In a separating equilibrium, competition always drives the
H-type contract to but not beyond the full insurance contract at the fair H-type
premium, where cross-subsidization is again not possible due to cream-skimming
deviations. Finally, competition drives the L-type contract to the contract that,
yielding zero profits, is the best possible contract for L-types given the incen-
tive compatibility constraint on H-types. Note that the RS contracts can be
obtained as the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
ωL,ωH
uL(ωL)
s.t.
uH(ωH) ≥ uH(ωL)
(1− pH)(w01 − w
H
1 ) + pH(w02 − w
H
2 ) ≥ 0
(1− pL)(w01 − w
L
1 ) + pL(w02 − w
L
2 ) ≥ 0
i.e. L-type utility is maximized subject to incentive compatibility for theH-type
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and constraints specifying that each contract is separately zero profit-making.
From the above maximization problem, it is easy to see that RS contracts are
independent of the shares of risk types in the population. Then, an equilibrium
in pure strategies with the RS allocation might not exist for the following rea-
son: If the share of H-types is low, there are profitable pooling contracts or
(cross-subsidizing) contract menus that are preferred by both risk types over
their respective RS contracts. However, pooling, or a cross-subsidizing con-
tract menu cannot be tendered in equilibrium as cream-skimming would occur.
Hence, an equilibrium in pure strategies might fail to exist if the share of high
risk types is low.
In Figure 2.1, the RS contracts can be overturned by a simple pooling deviation.
Note that even if there is no pooling contract that is profitable and preferred
by both risk types, still a cross-subsidizing contract menu can be profitable and
preferred to the RS contracts, i.e. the equilibrium inexistence problem is aggra-
vated when firms offer contract menus as in our specification instead of single
contracts as in the original RS model. Furthermore, from the above discussion
it is also clear that RS contracts are not necessarily second-best efficient: If
there exists a profitable deviation overturning the RS contracts, the resulting
allocation would be more efficient than the RS allocation.9 We can summarize
the above results as follows:
Result 2.1 (Rothschild-Stiglitz) Any equilibrium in pure strategies yields
the RS allocation. However, an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist if
the share of high risk types is low. Furthermore, the RS allocation is not gener-
ally second-best efficient.
9 A second-best efficient allocation is Pareto efficient among those that satisfy self-selection
conditions and resource constraints, see Crocker and Snow (1985). The resource constraint
here translates to nonnegative profits on the whole population.
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2.2 The equilibrium nonexistence debate
From the review of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, we have established that an
equilibrium in pure strategies might not exist. In an application on their gen-
eral existence theorem of mixed-strategy equilibria in discontinuous games, Das-
gupta and Maskin (1986) prove existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz model and partially characterize the equilibrium: H-types
are always fully insured, and firms mix between jointly zero-profit making con-
tract menus.10 However, although mixed strategies are a meaningful concept
in several economic environments, an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the in-
surance market does not seem particularly appealing: For any contract menu
offered with some probability, once it is offered, competitors would want to
change their own contracts. Then it is not clear why insurers should only act
simultaneously and not be allowed to react to their competitors contract offers
once these are observed; or, put differently, this raises the question of when
and how often insurers are allowed to modify contracts and thus react to their
competitors.
In consequence, rather than settling on a mixed-strategy equilibrium, it seems
sensible to rethink models of competition in adverse selection insurance markets.
Early works by Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979) map the idea of a reaction to
competitors by modifying the equilibrium concept to include expectations about
competitor behavior. Instead of modifying the equilibrium concept, a second
vein of research explicitly models dynamic insurance market interactions (Hell-
wig 1987; Engers and Fernandez 1987; Jaynes 1978; Asheim and Nilssen 1996;
Ania, Tro¨ger, and Wambach 2002). A third strand takes a different approach
and does not include dynamics, but changes the contract or insurer character-
istics (Inderst and Wambach 2001; Faynzilberg 2006; Picard 2009). Below, we
10 For the screening version of Spence (1973)’s signalling model of education that exhibits a
similar structure as the RS model, Rosenthal and Weiss (1984) derive an equilibrium in
mixed strategies. A somewhat unsatisfying characteristic of equilibrium is that although
there is no profitable deviation for existing firms in the market, an entrant can earn positive
expected profits.
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will discuss these contributions in more detail.11
2.2.1 Modification of the equilibrium concept
Wilson (1977) proposes the “anticipatory equilibrium” concept, or E2 equilib-
rium. In this concept, an expectation rule is imposed such that “each firm
assumes that any policy will be immediately withdrawn which becomes un-
profitable after that firm makes its own policy offer”. Wilson (1977) considers
single contract offers and shows that the anticipatory equilibrium concept leads
to a pooling allocation in which low risk utility is maximized subject to an
overall zero-profit condition, the so-called Wilson pooling contract. This pool-
ing contract is tendered in equilibrium as with the above expectation rule, if a
cream-skimming deviation is attempted, the Wilson contract would be assumed
to be withdrawn such that the deviator expects all types to choose the deviating
contract, which in turn renders it unprofitable.
Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) extend the analysis to contract menus and
show that the anticipatory equilibrium concept results in an allocation with sep-
arating, cross-subsidizing, jointly zero-profit making contracts that are second-
best efficient, the Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) contracts. Formally, consider
the following maximization problem:
max
ωL,ωH
uL(ωL)
s.t.
uH(ωH) ≥ uH(ωL)
uH(ωH) ≥ uH(ωHRS)
γH [(1− pH)(w01 − w
H
1 ) + pH(w02 − w
H
2 )]+
(1− γH)[(1− pL)(w01 − w
L
1 ) + pL(w02 − w
L
2 )] ≥ 0
where ωHRS denotes the H-type RS contract. The above maximization problem
11 In this review, we discuss literature that in the spirit of RS uses noncooperative game-
theoretic methods and do not consider cooperative concepts as e.g. Lacker and Weinberg
(1999) or RS economies in general-equilibrium frameworks as e.g. in Dubey and Geanako-
plos (2002) or Bisin and Gottardi (2006).
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has a unique solution.12
Definition 2.1 The unique solution to the above maximization problem are the
Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence contracts, denoted by ωHWMS and ω
L
WMS.
Hence, the WMS contracts are obtained by maximizing U -type utility subject
to an overall zero profit condition allowing for cross-subsidization. Note that
this implies that the WMS contracts are second-best efficient.
Remark 2.1 (Crocker and Snow 1985) The WMS contracts are second-best
efficient.
When the second constraint on H-type utility is binding, the WMS contracts
correspond to the RS contracts. Note that since in the RS model there is no
equilibrium if RS contracts can be overturned by a profitable deviating menu,
an equilibrium exists in the RS model exactly when the WMS contracts coincide
with the RS contracts, i.e. an equilibrium with the RS allocation exists if and
only if the RS contracts are second-best efficient. When the second constraint
on H-type utility is not binding, WMS contracts are such that the fully-insured
H-types are subsidized by the partially insured L-types. The WMS contracts
in this case are shown below in Figure 2.2. The dotted curve gives all L-types
contracts that combined with a full insurance contract that lies on the same H-
type indifference curve as the L-type contract jointly yield zero-profits if taken
out by the whole population. Among these L-type contracts, the WMS L-type
contract then is the contract that maximizes L-type utility.
At the heart of Wilson (1977)’s anticipatory equilibrium is the notion that con-
tracts, if unprofitable, will be withdrawn. In Riley (1979)’s “reactive equilib-
rium” concept, instead of contract withdrawal, insurers expect competitors to
make new contract offers, i.e. react by adding contracts. To be precise, “a set
of offers is a reactive equilibrium if, for any additional offer which generates an
expected gain to the agent making the offer, there is another which yields a gain
to a second agent and losses to the first...”. It is easy to see that the reactive
12 See e.g. Asheim and Nilssen (1996).
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w2
w1
uL
uH
ωLWMS
ωHWMS
ωHRS
ωLRS
Figure 2.2: WMS contracts
equilibrium concept yields the RS allocation: For any profitable deviation on
the RS contracts with a pooling contract or contract menu, the expectation
rule implies that firms anticipate the addition of a cream-skimming contract by
another competitor, rendering the deviation unprofitable.
2.2.2 Dynamic market interaction
The notion that insurance markets are more dynamic than in the RS model has
been, instead of imposing expectation rules, translated to explicitly modelling
dynamic insurance market interactions between firms. Engers and Fernandez
(1987), besides generalizing Riley (1979)’s reactive equilibrium notion, provide a
game-theoretic foundation for the reactive equilibrium with the following game:
First, insurers set contracts. After observation of competitors’ offers, firms may
repeatedly add new contracts to their existing offers such that there is no ex-
ogenously determined last mover. If no more contracts are added, consumers
choose contracts. This implements the Riley logic such that an equilibrium with
the RS allocation exists as again cream-skimming on deviations renders any de-
viation unprofitable. However, with the same logic, different allocations than
RS can be sustained as equilibrium allocations.
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In Hellwig (1987), instead of adding contracts, insurers may decide to not fulfill a
contract. In particular, firms first offer a single contract, consumers then choose
their insurance contract in the second stage, and insurers can in a third stage
decide not to fulfill the contract already chosen by a consumer. Note that, since
insurers offer single contracts, this type of contract withdrawal corresponds to
exit from the market. Hellwig (1987) shows that the Wilson pooling contract
corresponds to a stable equilibrium of this three-stage game, as cream-skimming
would lead insurers to exit the market. However, when allowing for contract
menus and individual contract withdrawal, the WMS contracts do not consti-
tute equilibrium contracts in Hellwig (1987)’s game as any firm would have an
incentive to withdraw the high risk contract.
Whereas the above contributions add stages to the game in which insurers can
revise their set of contract offers, Jaynes (1978) relaxes the assumption that
contracts are exclusive and considers firm interaction in the form of sharing
information. Jaynes (1978) argues that this leads to some firms offering the
Wilson pooling contract which share information among them, and some firms
offer contracts at the fair H-type premium rate who do not share information.
Hellwig (1988) translates the idea into the following game: First, firms offer con-
tracts and can attach an exclusivity condition on it. Then, consumers choose
combinations of contracts. In the third stage, insurers decide what customer
information to share with which insurers, and in the fourth stage firms receive
information and decide on enforcing exclusivity conditions.13 Hellwig (1988)
shows that since insurers in the last stages can strategically condition infor-
mation sharing and enforcement of exclusivity conditions on stage 1 offers, the
equilibrium proposed in Jaynes (1978) corresponds to a sequentiel equilibrium
of the game and cannot be upset by a cream-skimming offer: High risks would
prefer to supplement their insurance purchase by this cream-skimming offer,
rendering it unprofitable. As the firm offering this cream-skimming contract
would not receive information from other firms, it could not enforce exclusivity
13 Ales and Maziero (2009) and Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2010) consider non-exclusive
contracting in RS environments without information sharing. In both models, a pure
strategy equilibrium may fail to exist.
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conditions to prevent high risks from taking the contract.
In Asheim and Nilssen (1996), insurers can renegotiate contracts with their own
customers on a nondiscriminatory basis. Asheim and Nilssen (1996) show that
WMS is the unique equilibrium allocation for the following reason: a cream-
skimming contract that by construction of WMS contracts lies outside the ef-
ficiency region, would be renegotiated to an efficient contract that yields high
risks higher utility than their respective WMS contract, even if all high risk types
choose this contract. Then, high risks would choose the deviating contract, ren-
dering it unprofitable. Note that the overall result depends on the assumption
that insurers cannot renegotiate contracts individually, which seems unrealistic
once consumers have chosen an insurance contract.
In a methodically different approach, Ania, Tro¨ger, and Wambach (2002) model
dynamics in insurance markets using evolutionary game theory. Insurers do
not have perfect knowledge about the market and imitate successful behavior,
i.e. they copy the most profitable contract on the market and in addition, they
experiment with their own contracts. RS contracts are the long run outcome of
the evolutionary game if insurers experiment only locally. This is because even
if a pooling contract is preferred, the RS contracts cannot be destabilized by
small changes in contracts, whereas pooling contracts can.
2.2.3 Changes to contract or insurer characteristics
Instead of introducing additional stages to the RS game to model dynamics,
another strand of literature modifies the assumptions about insurer character-
istics or initial contracts offered. In Inderst and Wambach (2001), insurers face
capacity constraints such that the amount of offered contracts at an insurer is
limited and consumers might be rationed. When consumers have search costs,
the risk of being rationed and thus to incur search costs can lead to the ’wrong’
type of consumers turning up at insurers. In particular, consider a pooling devi-
ation on RS contracts: As the gain in utility at this deviating contract is higher
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for high risk types due to the single-crossing property, for search cost sufficiently
but not too high only high risks would choose the deviating contract, rendering
it unprofitable. Thus, capacity constraints sustain an equilibrium with the RS
allocation.14
Instead of capacity constraints, in an unpublished working paper Faynzilberg
(2006) assumes that the financial resources of insurers are exogenously limited.
Then, the expected utility that a customer receives from a contract might not
correspond to the expected utility derived from the parameters of the contract
as the insurer, due to lack of financial resources, might not be able to fulfill
the contract. The analysis in Faynzilberg (2006) suggests that this leads to an
equilibrium with the WMS allocation if the financial constraint is severe: Since
high risk type utility from the WMS contract is lowered if the contract is not
cross-subsidized by low risks, a cream-skimming deviation might be attractive
to high risks as well.
In a recent working paper, in contrast to the two previous works that impose
exogenous constraints on insurers, Picard (2009) endogenizes the contract struc-
ture by lifting the assumption that insurance contracts are nonparticipating. In
particular, insurers may choose to offer contracts in which customers share the
profits or losses of the insurer. Fully participating contracts are implemented
in a mutual. Picard (2009) shows that this sustains the WMS allocation in
equilibrium as a cream-skimming deviation imposes losses on the high risk type
WMS contract such that high risks as well prefer the deviating contract.15
Note that all three models share the feature that the actual expected utility
that customers receive from a contract at an insurer is modified and customers
take this into account when choosing an insurance contract.
14 Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) combine adverse selection with competitive search
theory. Principals post terms of trade, privately informed agents direct their search, and
principals and agents are then matched bilaterally. An equilibrium exists in an RS-type
application as with bilateral matching, a pooling offer to attract a cross-section of types is
less attractive to good types for the following reason: the more agents search an offer, the
less likely is a match. Now it is exactly the good types that are discouraged from searching
as their outside option, the separating contract, is higher. Note that this works similarly
to the above discussed capacity constraints.
15 Picard (2009) also analyzes the n-type case and thereby shows coexistence of mutuals and
stock insurers.
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2.2.4 Synthesis
Even more than 30 years after its first publication, the RS result that an equi-
librium in pure strategies might not exist in a competitive insurance market
with adverse selection is still puzzling. To solve the problem, besides early work
on modifications of the equilibrium concept, research has either introduced dy-
namics into the RS model or modified assumptions about insurer or contract
characteristics. In each of these different strands of research, there are models
that yield the RS allocation, as well as models that yield the WMS allocation.
The RS allocation has the feature intuitively associated with competition that
each contract is separately zero-profit making; yet it is not generally second-
best efficient. The WMS allocation is second-best efficient, however precisely
because it is second-best efficient it requires cross-subsidization in equilibrium,
which seems counterintuitive in a competitive market. This highlights again the
crucial issue that is at the core of the original equilibrium nonexistence result:
competition and efficiency do not necessarily go hand in hand in this market.
In extensions of the RS model these different allocations can be sustained in
equilibrium as, put broadly, RS contracts cannot be overturned if a deviation
on all risks is rendered unprofitable because a deviator ends up with high risks,
and the WMS allocation can be sustained if a deviator can not offer contracts
such that only low risks are attracted.
However, although the review shows that extensive research has been conducted
to settle the equilibrium nonexistence problem, the debate is still open as there
is no generally agreed upon solution. This stems from several reasons: Firstly,
one of the most appealed to solutions, the Wilson concept, lacks sound game-
theoretic foundation. Another issue is that some modifications to the RS model
seem rather arbitrary: In e.g. Asheim and Nilssen (1996), it is not clear why
when insurers can renegotiate, they cannot renegotiate on an individual basis.
A related criticism is that with the exception of Picard (2009) who endogenizes
contract characteristics, models impose exogenous constraints: In e.g. Inderst
and Wambach (2001), the RS allocation is sustained as firms are assumed to be
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capacity constrained, however if insurers were to choose their capacity, limited
capacity would not be the outcome of the generalized game.
In light of the above discussion, the following two chapters aim to close the RS
debate by providing solutions that address these problems: Chapter 3 provides
a game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson concept. Chapter 4 considers an
endogenous framework in which insurers can choose their capital level.
3 A Game-Theoretic Foundation
for the Wilson Equilibrium
This chapter extends the RS model in the spirit of Wilson (1977)’s “anticipatory
equilibrium” by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can
be withdrawn repeatedly after observation of competitors’ contract offers. We
show that an equilibrium always exists where consumers obtain their respective
Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) contract. Jointly profit-making contracts can
also be sustained as equilibrium contracts. However, the WMS allocation is the
unique equilibrium allocation under entry.
3.1 Introduction
To date, one of the most appealed to solutions to the RS equilibrium nonex-
istence problem is still the Wilson anticipatory equilibrium concept. However
surprisingly, despite its appeal the Wilson concept has never been formally mod-
elled, i.e. although some research on the equilibrium inexistence problem yields
the WMS allocation, the mechanisms in these models are quite different from
the idea of withdrawing contracts in reaction to competitors.
The present chapter spells out the idea behind the Wilson “anticipatory equi-
librium concept” by introducing an additional stage into the RS model in which
firms can withdraw individual contracts (repeatedly) before consumers make
their choice but after observing the contract offers of competitors. We show
that an equilibrium always exists where every consumer obtains her respec-
tive WMS contract. Intuitively, the possibility of contract withdrawal prevents
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cream-skimming deviations that upset the WMS contracts in the original RS
set-up. However, to sustain the WMS equilibrium, not only the WMS, but also
a continuum of low risk contracts as well as the RS contracts have to be on offer
as latent contracts. The reason is that the possibility to withdraw contracts
allows for sophisticated deviating strategies that are prevented by latent con-
tracts that, off the equilibrium path, attract low risks away from such possible
deviations.16
We show moreover that, besides the WMS contracts, profit-making contracts
can also be enforced as equilibrium contracts as the possibility to retract con-
tracts provides firms with adequate threat points. More generally, contract
withdrawal leads to a multiplicity of equilibrium allocations. This multiplicity
remains if, instead of only considering contract withdrawal, we allow for the
addition of contracts in the second stage. We then extend the game to allow for
entry as would be expected in a model of a competitive market. Then, positive
profits cannot be sustained in equilibrium. More strongly, the WMS equilibrium
is generically unique under entry.
There is a small literature where contract withdrawal is added to a market with
adverse selection. This literature differs from the present work in that while
we allow the withdrawal of individual contracts to model the logic behind the
Wilson equilibrium, contract withdrawal in the literature so far implies exit
from the market, i.e. only complete contracts withdrawal. Hellwig (1987), as
discussed in chapter 2, only considers exit and the WMS equilibrium cannot
be sustained when insurers offer contract menus and can withdraw individual
contracts in his game in which the offered contract can be withdrawn after
insurees choose. A study with a similar timing structure as ours is Netzer and
Scheuer (2008). In a model of moral hazard without commitment, Netzer and
Scheuer (2008) model competition after unobservable effort choice such that
16 Latent contracts are not new in adverse selection environments. Attar, Mariotti, and
Salanie (2009) model nonexclusive competition in an adverse selection market. In their
model, infinitely many contracts need to be issued as latent contracts to sustain the equi-
librium allocation as well.
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firms offer contract menus and can, after observation of competitor’s offers,
decide to exit the market before consumers choose contracts. Again, contrary
to our model, the restriction to exit does not allow to withdraw individual
loss-making contracts. This is not a minor point but relates to a more general
problem: why should a firm in a competitive market offer a loss-making contract.
We show that, even when individual contracts can be withdrawn, firms may offer
loss-making contracts in a competitive market.
3.2 The model
The set-up closely follows Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977):
There is a continuum of individuals with mass 1. Each individual faces two possi-
ble states of nature: In state 1, no loss occurs and the endowment is w01, in state
2 a loss occurs and the endowment is w02 with w01 > w02 > 0. There are two
types of individuals, an individual may be a high risk type (H) with loss proba-
bility pH , or a low-risk type (L) with loss probability pL, with 0 < pL < pH < 1.
Insurance is provided by firms in the set F := {1, ..., f, ...n}. Firms do not know,
ex ante, any individual’s type. If an individual buys insurance, then the initial
endowment ω0 = (w01, w02) is traded for another state-contingent endowment
ω = (w1, w2); we say the individual buys insurance contract ω. The set of fea-
sible contracts, Ω, is given by Ω := {(w1, w2) |w1 ≥ w2 > 0} where w1 < w2 is
ruled out for moral hazard considerations.
The expected utility of a J-type individual, J ∈ {H,L} from chosing a contract
ω ∈ Ω is abbreviated by uJ(ω) := (1− pJ)v(w1) + p
Jv(w2) where v is a strictly
increasing, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.
The timing of the game is as follows: First, firms set contracts simultaneously
and observe their competitors’ contract offers. Then, firms can withdraw con-
tracts potentially repeatedly for several rounds whereby firms observe their
competitors remaining contract offers after each round. Contract withdrawal
is possible as long as at least one contract was withdrawn by any firm in the
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previous round. After contract withdrawal ends, consumers make their contract
choice. Formally, the game proceeds as follows:
Stage 0: The risk type of each individual is chosen by nature. Each individ-
ual has a chance of γ, 0 < γ < 1 to be a H-type, and of (1−γ) to be a L-type.
Stage 1: Each firm f ∈ F offers a set of contracts Ωf1 ⊂ Ω. The offered sets
are observed by all firms before the beginning of the next stage.
Stage 2: Stage 2 consists of t = 1, 2, ... rounds. In each round t, each firm
f ∈ F can withdraw a set from its remaining contracts. After each round,
firms observe the remaining contract offers of all firms. Denote by Ωf2,t firm
f ’s contract set on offer at the end of t. For notational convenience, we de-
note Ωf1 := Ω
f
2,0. If, for any t, Ω
f
2,t = Ω
f
2,t−1 for all f ∈ F , this stage ends.
Denote the final round in stage 2 by tˆ, i.e. Ωf
2,tˆ
= Ωf
2,tˆ−1
for all f ∈ F .
Stage 3: Individuals choose among the remaining contracts
⋃
F
Ωf
2,tˆ
or remain
uninsured.
Before proceeding, let us discuss the difference of our setup to Rothschild-Stiglitz
and how this implements the Wilson concept: The Rothschild-Stiglitz game cor-
responds to stages 0, 1 and 3. In this reduced game, a pooling contract or more
generally cross-subsidizing contracts cannot be sustained as equilibrium con-
tracts as insurers would always try to cream skim low risks. In Wilson’s “antici-
patory equilibrium” concept, such cream skimming deviations are not profitable
because the expectation rule is that cross-subsidized contracts at non-deviating
insurers would be withdrawn since they become unprofitable after introduction
of the cream-skimming contract. We implement this concept by adding stage
2. However, when instead of imposing an expectation rule, firms are explic-
itly allowed to withdraw contracts after observation of competitor’s contract
offers, for the Wilson reasoning to hold in a game with contract menus contract
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withdrawal has to end endogenously as in our model specification: with fixed
withdrawal rounds, as e.g. only one round of contract withdrawals, a single firm
would always be able to profitably deviate by withdrawing a cross-subsidized
contract in the last round.
When stage 2 ends after round tˆ and contract ωfj ∈ Ω
f
2,tˆ
is taken out by a mass
of individuals λfj among which the share of H-types is σ
f
j , then the expected
profit of firm f ∈ F is:
pif =
∫
Ωf
2,tˆ
λfj
[
(w01 − w
f
j,1)− (p
Hσfj + p
L(1− σfj ))(w
f
j,2 − w02 + w01 − w
f
j,1)
]
dω
As we did not restrict the sets of contract offers in stage 1 to be finite, stage
2 does not necessarily end. For t → +∞, we specify that firms make zero
(expected) profits. Let us stress that it is solely out of simplicity that we do not
restrict the set of feasible contracts Ω and hence do not assume contract offers
to be finite such that stage 2 does not necessarily end. All our results hold if
instead of Ω as defined above we would consider a discrete contract grid and
thus a finite number of stage 1 contract offers.
3.3 Equilibrium with WMS allocation
We will show that the WMS allocation can be sustained as equilibrium alloca-
tion, however, in order to prevent such deviations, latent contracts have to be
offered alongside the WMS contracts to support the WMS equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a symmetric equilibrium where every individual
obtains her respective WMS contract in stage 3.
Proof See Appendix. 
Consider the following firm strategy: In stage 1, firms offer the WMS contracts
and additionally the RS contracts as well as a continuum of contracts that lie
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on the L-type fair insurance line and give the L-type a lower expected utility
than her WMS contract but higher expected utility than her RS contract. We
name this continuum of contracts ’LR contracts’. These contracts are shown in
Figure 3.1.
w2
w1
w02
w01
LR contracts
uH
ωLWMS
ωHWMS
ωHRS
ωLRS
Figure 3.1: Contracts on offer in equilibrium
Then, in stage 2, after each round t, each firm computes the hypothetical profit
it would make if stage 2 ended after round t and, if it makes a loss, withdraws
the loss-making contract(s), but does not withdraw any contracts if it makes
zero expected profits.
This strategy supports the WMS allocation for the following reasoning: A simple
cream-skimming deviation is prevented by withdrawing WMS contracts as they
become unprofitable. Similarly, as stage 2 ends endogenously, a deviation that
involves the withdrawal of theH-type WMS contract in some round is prevented
as all other firms withdraw the loss-making H-type WMS contract subsequently.
Furthermore, a deviation aimed at forcing firms to withdrawWMS contracts and
making a positive profit on e.g. a pooling contract is prevented by withdrawing
those contracts from the LR contracts that would be taken up by H-types and
hence be loss-making, but leaving exactly those that would not be taken up
by H-types but only by L-types and hence cream-skim the L-types from any
deviating contract (menu). This type of deviation and the reaction according
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to the equilibrium strategy is shown in Figure 3.2. Finally, the RS contracts
always remain on offer since they are separately zero profit making.
w2
w1
w02
w01
deviating contract menu
WMS contracts will be withdrawn
contracts withdrawn if deviator with-
draws cream-skimming contract
Figure 3.2: Reaction to a deviation
In this equilibrium, latent contracts are offered: the RS contracts and the LR
contracts. A standard criticism of latent contracts is that they are loss-making
off the equilibrium path. Note that this is not the case here: If, off the equi-
librium path, latent contracts would be the best available contracts on offer for
some type, they would either not be loss-making, or they would be withdrawn
such that they cannot be chosen in stage 3. In particular, either the LR con-
tracts are taken up only by low risks, or, potentially in more than one round,
withdrawn. The other latent contracts, the RS contracts, will never be with-
drawn, however, they are zero-profit making anyway.
The above Proposition provides an existence result for an equilibrium with an
allocation that yields zero expected profits and is second-best efficient. How-
ever, this is not the unique equilibrium allocation. In the next section it will be
shown that there also exist equilibria where firms share positive profits.
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3.4 Equilibrium with positive profits
To show that equilibria exist in which firms share positive profits, we will first
concentrate on a simple case: Consider the full insurance contract that extracts
all consumer surplus from H-types. We denote this contract by ωP . Now as
ωP just leaves H-types indifferent between purchasing insurance and remaining
uninsured, ωP will not be taken up by L-types, but it yields a per (H-type)
customer profit equal to the H-type risk premium and hence, as 0 < γ, strictly
positive profits overall. Note that, if the share of H-types is sufficiently high,
ωP corresponds to the monopoly allocation.
Proposition 3.2 The profit-making full insurance contract ωP can be sustained
as equilibrium contract in a symmetric equilibrium for any number of firms in
the market.
Proof See Appendix. 
The possibility to withdraw contracts allows firms to coordinate on a profit-
making allocation: Consider offering ωP and the set of contracts from the equi-
librium strategy in Proof of Proposition 1, i.e. the WMS and RS contracts
and LR contracts. If only those contracts are observed, all contracts different
from ωP are withdrawn sequentially in stage 2. In particular, firms first have to
withdraw the H-type WMS and RS contracts first such that there is no pooling
deviation on any of those contracts. After that, all remaining contracts differ-
ent from ωP are withdrawn since they are loss-making if taken out by both risk
types. Initial contract offers and the equilibrium contract are shown in Figure
3.3.
Then, if any deviating, stand-alone profit-making contracts are observed, the
WMS (and all other initial contracts) are not withdrawn. This intuition works
as it is credible for firms not to withdraw the WMS contracts and make zero
profits on WMS contracts when they observe deviation. It is credible because
any profitable deviation from ωP implies that if WMS, RS and LR contracts are
withdrawn, insurers make zero expected profits, hence, it is sequentionally ra-
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w2
w1
w02
w01
initial contract offers
contracts withdrawn in first round on
equilibrium path
contracts withdrawn
in second round
on equilibrium path
ωP
uH
uH
Figure 3.3: profit-making allocation
tional not to withdraw the WMS, RS and LR contracts and make zero expected
profits on WMS contracts. Again, as was the logic in the Proof of Proposition
1, attempting a deviation by initially offering a cream-skimming deviation such
that WMS contracts have to been withdrawn is prevented by the offer of RS
and LR contracts.17
From the above intuition it is also clear why we consider the case in which
the final allocation corresponds to a single contract only taken up by H-types:
Any deviation on this contract leads to zero expected profits for the remain-
ing firms. This is not necessarily the case for a contract menu, as each contract
might be separately profit-making (or similarly a pooling contract without cross-
subsidization). Then a deviator might only deviate on one contract/risk type,
leaving firms with a positive profit on the other contract/risk type such that the
threat of not withdrawing the WMS contracts is not credible.
However, although we have concentrated on a particular equilibrium allocation
in Proposition 2, with the above logic it is simple to show that any pooling
contract that involves cross-subsidization and lies below the H-type indifference
curve through theH-type WMS contract as well as any profit-making separating
17 Note that, as discussed in section 2, the possibility to sustain positive profits in equilibrium
does not stem from the fact that stage 2 is potentially infinite.
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contract menu that yields nonpositive profits on one risk type can be supported
as equilibrium allocation using strategies analogous to those that support the
equilibrium allocation from Proposition 2. Similarly, it is easy to show that the
RS contracts can also be supported as equilibrium contracts.
Furthermore, note that even in the case of a contract menu with separately
profit-making contracts, this contract menu might be supported as the equilib-
rium allocation in an asymmetric equilibrium of the following form: In stage
1, one firm offers intermediate contracts that yield positive and in particular
more than 1/nth of the profit of each contract from the menu separately, but
less than 1/nth of total profits from the menu. All other firms follow the strat-
egy described previously. If there is no deviation, then all contracts except the
profit-making contract menu will be withdrawn, and this is sequentially ratio-
nal for all firms, even for the firm offering the intermediate contracts, as the
intermediate contracts yield less than 1/nth of total profits from the contract
menu. If a deviation ’below’ intermediate contracts is observed, the intermedi-
ate contracts will not be withdrawn, and this is again sequentially rational, as
intermediate profits yield more than 1/nth of the profit of each contract from
the menu separately.18
3.5 Riley extension
So far, we have only considered contract withdrawal in stage 2 in the spirit of
Wilson. However, if contracts can be withdrawn, it seems plausible to enlarge
the action space and allow for also offering new contracts in stage 2 to add
the dynamic proposed in Riley’s reactive equilibrium. In a survey, Riley (2001)
conjectures that in a game where firms are allowed to either add or drop offers
in the second stage “both the Wilson and reactive equilibria are a Nash equi-
librium of this new game”. Consider the game with the following modification:
18 Note that, with an analoguous contract set to the LR contracts, a deviation on the inter-
mediate contracts can easily be prevented as well.
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Stage 2’: Stage 2 consists of t = 1, 2, ... rounds. In each round t, each firm
f ∈ F can withdraw a set from its remaining contracts and add any set of
contracts to the remaining contract. After each round, firms observe the con-
tract offers of all firms. Again, denote by Ωf2,t firm f ’s contract set on offer
at the end of t. If, for any t, Ωf2,t = Ω
f
2,t−1 ∀ f ∈ F , this stage ends.
We will now argue that this extension of the action space does not eliminate
equilibrium allocations, in particular profit-making equilibria can still be sus-
tained.
Proposition 3.3 Any equilibrium allocation of the original game can be sup-
ported as an equilibrium allocation in the extended game that allows for addi-
tional contract offers in stage 2.
Proof See Appendix. 
To see why, pick an equilibrium in the original game with the corresponding
equilibrium strategy of firms. Then, consider that firms have the same strategy,
with the addition that whenever they observe any new contract offer by any
other firm in stage 2, round t, then in round t + 1 they add the complete
set of contracts offered in stage 1 in the equilibrium strategy. That way, if,
e.g. in a profit-making equilibrium, after WMS, RS and LR contracts have
been withdrawn, a firm attempts to make a profit by offering a contract that
profitably attracts the whole population, this strategy replicates, in round t+1,
any possible configuration of contract offers at the end of stage 1 in the original
game. However, then there is no profitable deviation since it was an equilibrium
in the original game. This result allows us to formally confirm Riley (2001)’s
conjecture:
Corollary 3.1 In the game in which contracts can be withdrawn and added
in stage 2, both the WMS and RS allocation can be sustained as equilibrium
allocations.
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3.6 Entry
We will now allow for entry in any round in stage 2. In particular, entry takes
the following form: There are m ≥ 2 potential entrants. A potential entrant can
decide in which round t to enter in stage 2 as long as in t − 1 there was either
entry or some contract withdrawn as otherwise stage 2 would end after t − 1,
and then to offer a set of contracts. Once an entrant has offered a nonempty
set of contracts in some round t, he can, as incumbents, withdraw contracts
from the offered contracts in subsequent rounds. We specify that if an entrant
is indifferent between entering the market or not, the entrant enters. Formally,
the game proceeds as follows:
Stage 2′′: Stage 2′′ consists of t = 1, 2, ... rounds. There is a set of entrants
E := {1, ..., f, ...m} with m ≥ 2. As long as firm f ∈ E does not enter, we
say that f offers Ωf2,t = ∅ in round t. In any round t for which Ω
f
2,t 6= Ω
f
2,t−1
for some f ∈ F ∪ E, any f ∈ E with Ωf2,j = ∅ for all j = 1, .., t − 1 can
decide on entering the market and offer a set of contracts Ωf2,t ∈ P(Ω) \ ∅
in t. We denote the round in which f ∈ E enters by t¯f . In each round t,
each firm f ∈ F ∪ E can withdraw a set from its remaining contracts. After
each round, firms observe the contract offers of all firms. Denote by Ωf2,t firm
f ’s contract set on offer at the end of t. If, for any t, Ωf2,t = Ω
f
2,t−1 for all
f ∈ F ∪ E, this stage ends. Define tˆ by Ωf
2,tˆ
= Ωf
2,tˆ−1
for all f ∈ F ∪ E.
Stage 3”: Individuals choose among the contracts
⋃
F∪E
Ωf
2,tˆ
.
Now under entry, an equilibrium with the WMS allocation still always exists.
More strongly, it is generically unique:
Proposition 3.4 In the game with entry, an equilibrium with the WMS allo-
cation exists and is generically unique.
Proof See Appendix. 
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The proof proceeds in two steps. First, it is shown that an equilibrium with
the WMS allocation always exists. In the second step, it is shown that any
equilibrium yields the WMS allocation.
The reasoning why an equilibrium with the WMS allocation always exists is
very similar to the one for existence of WMS equilibrium without entry: As-
sume that firms initially on the market follow the strategy specified in proof of
Proposition 1, i.e. they offer the WMS, RS and LR contracts in stage 1 and, in
case they would make a loss if stage 2 were to end after round t− 1, they with-
draw the loss-making contracts in round t and do not withdraw any contract if
they make zero expected profits. The strategy of any entrant is the following:
If, after any round t − 1, incumbent firms (firms initially on the market and
previous entrants) would either make zero or positive profits if stage 2 ended
after round t − 1, then the entrant enters the market in t. If incumbent firms
make zero expected profits on WMS contracts, then the entrant offers WMS,
RS and LR contracts in t, otherwise, the entrant offers the largest contract set
that maximizes her expected profit given the contract offers of incumbents at
the end of t− 1. The entrant’s strategy in all subsequent rounds is the same as
that of initial firms. This constitutes an equilibrium with the WMS allocation
since any entrant cannot profitably deviate from the WMS contracts: Firstly,
some entrant will have to enter in t = 1 as otherwise stage 2 ends. Secondly, as
incumbent firms offer WMS, RS and LR contracts, there is no profitable devia-
tion as shown in proof of Proposition 1.
For the second step, assume on the contrary that an equilibrium exists that
yields an allocation that differs from WMS. Since it is an equilibrium, it yields
nonnegative profits to all firms. Then, independent of whether it is (an) ini-
tial firm(s) or (an) entrant(s) that serve customers, since the allocation is not
WMS, at least one entrant can profitably deviate by waiting to enter until the
last round and, in the last round, offering a slightly better contract menu at-
tracting all customers. Note that, as the deviating contract menu attracts all
types, i.e. yields a utility for both types at least as high as that on the contracts
that would have been the best on offer without the deviation, then there are
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no latent contracts by incumbents (firms active in stage 1 or previous entrants)
that can prevent this deviation.
Note that, although entry implies additional contract offers in stage 2, there
is a subtle difference to allowing additional contract offers by incumbent firms:
The situation under entry is asymmetric in the sense that, if there are positive
profits to be made, a firm can enter without the possibility of incumbent firms
to punish additional contract offers by own new contract offers.
3.7 Conclusion
We modify the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance model in the
spirit of Wilson (1977)’s “anticipatory equilibrium” concept by introducing an
additional stage in which firms can withdraw contracts (repeatedly) after ob-
servation of competitor’s contract offers. It is shown that an equilibrium always
exists where consumers obtain their respective Wilson- Miyazaki-Spence (WMS)
contract, i.e. second-best efficiency can be achieved for any share of high-risk
types in the population. However, contrary to intuition the game-theoretic anal-
ysis of the Wilson concept is not that straightforward: Latent contracts have to
be offered alongside the WMS contracts for the Wilson logic to work as contract
withdrawal allows for complex deviating strategies. Furthermore, equilibria ex-
ist in which firms share positive profits. When, besides contract withdrawal,
additional contracts can be offered in stage 2, all equilibrium allocations in the
game without adding contracts can be supported as equilibrium allocations in
the extended game. In particular, as suggested by Riley (2001), both the WMS
and RS allocations are equilibrium allocations in the extended game. However,
if there is entry in the second stage, the WMS equilibrium is generically unique.
The WMS equilibrium, both in the game with and without entry, is sustained
by the offer of latent contracts. There are mainly two arguments against the
possibility to offer latent contracts: The first one is that they might make losses
off the equilibrium path, and the second one that they lead to a multiplicity of
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equilibrium allocations.19 Note that the criticism does not apply here: latent
contracts either yield nonnegative profits, or will be withdrawn off the equi-
librium path. Furthermore, in the game with entry latent contracts are also
required to sustain the equilibrium allocation, however the equilibrium alloca-
tion is generically unique.
In this market, (non-linear) Bertrand competition is not sufficient to establish
outcomes that would be associated with a competitive market, namely that
firms make zero expected profits. To obtain zero profits, potential entry is
required. However, interestingly, cross-subsidization prevails in equilibrium al-
though there is entry.
3.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let ΩWMS :=
{
ωHWMS, ω
L
WMS
}
denote the set of WMS contracts, ΩRS :={
ωHRS, ω
L
RS
}
denote the set of RS contracts and
ΩLR :=
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣uL(ω) < uL(ωLWMS), uL(ω) > uL(ωLRS)
and (1− pL)(w01 − w1) + pL(w02 − w2) = 0
}
the continuum of contracts that lie on the L-type fair insurance line and yield
an L-type a higher expected utility than her RS contract but lower expected
utility than her WMS contract.
Let Ω1 := (Ω
1
1, ...Ω
n
1 ), Ω2,t := (Ω
1
2,t, ...,Ω
n
2,t) and let ht = (Ω1,Ω2,1, ...,Ω2,t−1)
denote the history in the beginning of round t. Furthermore, ∆2,t :=
⋃
F
Ωf2,t.
We denote by ω¯J2,t the contract such that
ω¯J2,t ∈ arg max
ω∈∆2,t
uJ(ω)
and
w¯J2 ≥ w˜
J
2 ∀ ω˜
J ∈ arg max
ω∈∆2,t
uJ(ω)
19 Criticism of latent contracts is e.g. reviewed in Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie (2009).
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Let k¯J denote the number of firms offering ω¯J2,t at the end of t, i.e. K¯
J :={
f ∈ F | ω¯J2,t ∈ Ω
f
2,t
}
and k¯J := |K¯J |.
The strategy of a consumer of type J is to choose ω¯J
2,tˆ
at firm f ∈ K¯J with
probability 1/k¯J .
A strategy of a firm f specifies a set of contracts in stage 1, and in stage 2,
round t, a map from the history to a set of remaining contracts of firm f at the
end of t in stage 2, i.e. αft : ht 7−→ Ω
f
2,t.
We denote the hypothetical profit of firm f if stage 2 would end after t− 1 by
pif (Ω2,t−1) := γH [(1− pH)(w01− w¯
H
1 )+ pH(w02− w¯
H
2 )](1/k¯
H)1IΩf
2,t−1
(ω¯H2,t−1)+
(1− γH)[(1− pL)(w01 − w¯
L
1 ) + pL(w02 − w¯
L
2 )](1/k¯
L)1IΩf
2,t−1
(ω¯L2,t−1)
where 1I is an indicator function. Similarly, we denote by
pif,J(Ω2,t−1) = γH [(1− pH)(w01 − w¯
J
1 ) + pH(w02 − w¯
J
2 )](1/k¯
J)1IΩf
2,t−1
(ω¯J2,t−1)
the hypothetical profits on J-types respectively. Finally, let
A :=
{
f ∈ F
∣∣∣Ωf1 ⊆ ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR} .
We propose that a possible equilibrium strategy of firms is the following: In
stage 1, firm f ∈ F offers Ωf1 = ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR. In stage 2, round t the
strategy of firm f specifies
αft (ht) =

Ωf2,t−1 if pi
f (Ω2,t−1) = 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ΩˆH2,t−1
}
if pif (Ω2,t−1) < 0 and pi
f,L(Ω2,t−1) ≥ 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ω¯L2,t−1
}
if pif (Ω2,t−1) < 0 and pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) ≥ 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ω¯H2,t−1, ω¯
L
2,t−1
}
if pif (Ω2,t−1) < 0 and
pif,L(Ω2,t−1), pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) < 0;
Ω¯f2,t if pi
f (Ω2,t−1) > 0.
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where
ΩˆH2,t−1 :=
{
ω ∈ Ωf2,t−1 \ {ΩRS} such that if Ω
j
2,t−1 = {ω} ∀j ∈ A,
then ω = ω¯H2,t−1 and pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) < 0
}
i.e. if firm f makes losses on H-types, it withdraws any contract that, if all
firms that in stage 1 offered the contracts according to equilibrium strategy (or
less contracts) only offered this one contract, would attract the H-types and be
loss-making. Furthermore, Ω¯f2,t denotes the largest set of contracts such that for
Ωj2,t = Ω
j
2,t−1 ∀j ∈ F \ {f}, then pi
f (Ω2,t) is maximal.
If all firms follow the above strategy, no firm withdraws any contract in t = 1
and stage 2 ends after t = 1, firms make zero expected profit and a customer of
type J receives her J-type WMS contract.
It remains to show that there is no profitable deviation. We will proceed in two
steps: First, we show that a deviator serves some H-types. In a second step, we
show that if the deviator serves some H-types, she cannot be making a strictly
positive profit.
Consider firm f¯ that offers Ωf¯1 in stage 1 and has a strategy αˆ
f¯ : ht 7−→ Ω
f¯
2,t in
stage 2. Let Ωf
2,tˆ
be the final set of contract offers of firm f , i.e. Ωf
2,tˆ
= Ωf
2,tˆ−1
∀
f ∈ F . Then it must be that pif (Ω2,tˆ−1) ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
as otherwise a firm
f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
would withdraw a nonempty set of contracts in tˆ and tˆ would not
be the last round in stage 2.
Now assume pif¯ (Ω2,tˆ) > 0. As pi
f (Ω2,tˆ−1) ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
, we will show
that w¯H
2,tˆ
∈ Ωf¯
2,tˆ
: Since pif¯ (Ω2,tˆ) > 0, f¯ serves some customers. To show that it
cannot be possible that f¯ serves only L-types, assume on the contrary that f¯
only serves L-types. If L-types prefer an insurance contract to remaining unin-
sured, than H-types prefer to be insured as well. As f¯ only serves L-types, then
at least one firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
serves H-types and the share of L-types among
customers at f is less than 1− γ. There are three possible cases:
Case 1 : ω¯H
2,tˆ
= ωHWMS. Now any firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
that serves H-types with
ωHWMS and has a share of L-types among customers that is less than 1− γ does
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not make a nonnegative profit.20 This contradicts pif (Ω2,tˆ−1) ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
.
Case 2 : ω¯H
2,tˆ
∈ ΩLR. Any contract ω ∈ ΩLR if taken up by some H-types is
loss-making, independent of whether it is also taken up by some L-types. This
contradicts pif (Ω
2,tˆ) ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
.
Case 3 : ω¯H
2,tˆ
= ωHRS. From the strategy of all f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
, both RS contracts will
never be withdrawn, i.e. the L-type contract is still on offer when ω¯H
2,tˆ
= ωHRS.
Then, there is no contract that f¯ can offer attracting L-types and making a
positive profit, which is a contradiction.
Hence, ω¯H
2,tˆ
∈ Ωf¯
2,tˆ
. We will now show that if ω¯H
2,tˆ
∈ Ωf¯
2,tˆ
, f¯ cannot be making
a positive profit. First, note that, the RS contracts are always, i.e. in any t,
offered by each firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
. Then, it follows that uH(ω¯H
2,tˆ
) ≥ uH(ωHRS).
There are again three possible cases:
Case 1 : uH(ω¯H
2,tˆ
) ≥ uH(ωHWMS). Then, ω
L
WMS will not have been withdrawn
by any firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
. As ωLWMS is on offer from firms f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
, by
construction of the WMS contracts, pif¯ (Ω2,tˆ) ≤ 0 for the cases that f¯ only serves
H-types or both types.
Case 2 : uH(ω¯H
2,tˆ
) < uH(ωHWMS) and ω¯
L
2,tˆ
∈ WCS. Hence, both WMS contracts
are not on offer at any firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
and any firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
does not serve
L-types since it does not offer any contract w ∈ WCS. However, by construction
of the WMS contracts, there is no incentive compatible menu of contracts with
w¯L
2,tˆ
∈ WCS that is profit-making, hence pif¯ (Ω
2,tˆ) < 0.
Case 3 : uH(ω¯H
2,tˆ
) < uH(ωHWMS) and ω¯
L
2,tˆ
/∈ ΩCS. If ω¯
H
2,tˆ
∈ ΩLR or , then
pif¯ (Ω2,tˆ) < 0. If ω¯
H
2,tˆ
/∈ ΩLR, then from the strategy of any firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
,
ω¯L
2,tˆ
∈ Ωf
2,tˆ
∀ f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
. Then, pif¯ (Ω2,tˆ) ≤ 0.
Hence, pif¯ (Ω2,tˆ) ≤ 0 which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let ΩP := {ωP}. Again, the strategy of a consumer of type J is to choose ω¯
J
2,tˆ
at firm f ∈ K¯J with probability 1/k¯J . Let ΩWH :=
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣uH(ω) < uH(ωP )}
20 This is because firm f ∈ F \
{
f¯
}
at best serves some L-types with ωLWMS , however, since
the share of L-types is less than 1− γ, this is loss-making.
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and let
B :=
{
f ∈ F
∣∣∣Ωf1 ⊆ ΩP ∪ ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR ∪ ΩWH} .
We claim that a possible equilibrium strategy of firms is the following: In stage
1, firm f ∈ F sets Ωf1 = ΩP ∪ ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR. In stage 2, round t the
strategy of firm f specifies
βft (ht) =

Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ωHRS, ω
H
WMS
}
if pif (Ω2,t−1) = 0 and B = F ;
Ωf2,t−1 if pi
f (Ω2,t−1) = 0 and B 6= F ;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ΩˆH2,t−1
}
if pif (Ω2,t) < 0 and pi
f,L(Ω2,t−1) ≥ 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ω¯L2,t−1
}
if pif (Ω2,t−1) < 0 and pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) ≥ 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ω¯H2,t−1, ω¯
L
2,t−1
}
if pif (Ω2,t−1) < 0 and
pif,L(Ω2,t−1), pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) < 0;
Ω¯f2,t if pi
f (Ω2,t−1) > 0.
ΩˆH2,t−1 :=
{
ω ∈ Ωf2,t−1 \ {ΩRS} such that if Ω
j
2,t−1 = {ω} ∀j ∈ B,
then ω = ω¯H2,t−1 and pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) < 0
}
i.e. if firm f makes losses on H-types, it withdraws any contract that, if all
firms that in stage 1 offered the contracts according to equilibrium strategy (or
less contracts) only offered this one contract, would attract the H-types and be
loss-making. Furthermore, Ω¯f2,t denotes the largest set of contracts such that for
Ωj2,t = Ω
j
2,t−1 ∀j ∈ F \ {f}, then pi
f (Ω2,t) is maximal.
The strategy thus specifies that if, after stage 1, there is no contract ω with
ω /∈ {ΩP ∪ ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR ∪ ΩWH} on offer, then the WMS, RS and LR
contracts will be sequentially withdrawn, however, if a contract ω with
ω /∈ {ΩP ∪ ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR ∪ ΩWH} is observed after stage 1, the WMS
contracts will not be withdrawn (if the firm’s hypothetical expected profit is
zero) and the strategy is the same as the stategy in proof of Proposition 1.
If all firms follow the above strategy, then all firms withdraw the H-type WMS
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contract and the H-type RS contracts in t = 1 and the L-type WMS and RS
contracts as well as LR contracts in t = 2. Stage 2 ends after t = 3, firms share
the profit on ωP , H-type customers buy ωP and L-types remain uninsured.
It remains to show that there is no profitable deviation. First, note that, since
firms share the profit from the single contract ωP , any deviation yielding a
higher profit than 1/nth of the profit from ωP necessarily yields zero expected
profits to nondeviating firms as they do not serve any customer. Then, it is
sequentially rational not to withdraw the WMS contracts as prescribed by the
equilibrium strategy.
The rest of the proof proceeds along the same lines as proof of Proposition 1
and is therefore omitted.21
Proof of Proposition 3.
Fix an equilibrium in the original game. In this equilibrium, the equilibrium
strategy of firm f ∈ F specifies a contract offer Ωf1 in stage 1 and in stage 2,
round t a withdrawal strategy χft (ht) specifying remaining contract offers in the
end of t. Note that, we neither assume that equilibrium strategies are symmetric
nor put any restrictions on stage 2 strategies.
In the extended game, a strategy specifies a contract offer in stage 1, and map
from the history ht to a contract offer in stage 2, round t.
Then consider the following strategy in the extended game: Firm f ∈ F offers
Ωf1 in stage 1. In stage 2, round t the strategy specifies
χ¯ft (ht) =

χft (ht) if Ω
j
2,t−1 ⊆ Ω
j
2,t−2 ∀j ∈ F ;
Ω˜ft if Ω
j
2,t−1 ⊆ Ω
j
2,t−2 ∀j ∈ F \ f and there exists a contract
ω ∈ Ωf2,t−1 with ω /∈ Ω
f
2,t−2;
Ωf1 otherwise.
where for notational simplicity, we denote stage 1 as round t = 0 and let Ωj2,−1 =
∅ ∀j ∈ F and Ω˜f is a set of contracts such that for Ωj2,t = Ω
j
2,t−1 ∀j ∈ F \ {f},
21 Note that, in particular a deviation aiming at offering the H-type WMS or RS contract
as a pooling contract is covered by proof of Proposition 1.
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then pif (Ω2,t) is maximal. Note that, in this case Ω˜ does not need to be the
largest set such that the profit is maximal as if there are some contracts with-
drawn or added in t, f can add contracts in t+ 1.
This strategy implies that firms have the same strategy as in the original game,
however, whenever a firm f observes another firm j adding contracts in the
previous round, then f replicates contract offers after stage 1 as it throws all
stage 1 contracts on the market.
Now firstly, this strategy yields the same equilibrium allocation as in the origi-
nal game as on the equilibrium path, each firm f ∈ F takes the same action in
stage 1 and in all rounds of stage 2 as on the corresponding equilibrium path in
the original game.
It remains to show that there is no profitable deviation. A profitable deviation
here means a deviation such that profits are higher than in equilibrium in the
original game. Assume a firm f¯ offers Ω̂f¯1 in stage 1 and has a strategy that
specifies some χ̂f¯t : ht 7−→ Ω
f¯
2,t in stage 2 and makes a profit that is strictly
higher than in the equilibrium in the original game. Firstly, note that this im-
plies that stage 2 ends in some t. We need to distinguish 4 cases:
Case 1: Ω̂f¯1 6= Ω
f¯
1 and χ̂
f¯
t (ht) = χ¯
f¯
t (ht). This implies that no contract will be
added by any firm f ∈ F in any round in stage 2. However, then either it
involves the same allocation and same profits for all firms as in the equilibrium
in the original game, or χf (ht) cannot have been part of an equilibrium strategy
in the original game for some f ∈ F .
Case 2: Ω̂f¯1 = Ω
f¯
1 , χ̂
f¯
t (ht) 6= χ¯
f¯
t (ht) and f¯ does not add any contract in any t.
Again, this implies that no contract will be added by any firm f ∈ F in any
round in stage 2. As in Case 1, then either it involves the same allocation and
same profits for all firms as in the equilibrium in the original game, or χf (ht)
cannot have been part of an equilibrium strategy in the original game for some
f ∈ F .
Case 3: Ω̂f¯1 = Ω
f¯
1 , χ̂
f¯
t (ht) 6= χ¯
f¯
t (ht) and f¯ adds at least one contract in some
t. Assume first that a contract will only be added by f¯ in at most one round
t and let t˜ denote this round. Then, the strategy of firms f ∈ F \ f¯ specifies
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that Ωf
t˜+1
= Ωf1 ∀f ∈ F \ f¯ . However, then, for t ≥ t˜ + 1 this replicates either
Case 1 or 2 above. Now assume that f¯ adds contracts in more than one round
t. Let tˇ denote the last round in which a contract will be added by f¯ . Again,
the strategy of firms f ∈ F \ f¯ specifies that Ωf
tˇ+1
= Ωf1 ∀f ∈ F \ f¯ . However,
then, this again replicates either Case 1 or 2 above.
Case 4: Ω̂f¯1 6= Ω
f¯
1 and χ̂
f¯
t (ht) 6= χ¯
f¯
t (ht). We can transform this case in the
following way: Instead of Ω̂f¯1 6= Ω
f¯
1 , let Ω̂
f¯
1 = Ω
f¯
1 and f¯ either adds or withdraws
some contract in stage 2, round 1 and plays χ̂f¯t (ht) thereafter. However, then,
this falls under one of the above cases.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We will proceed in two steps: First, we show that an equilibrium with the WMS
allocation always exists. In the second step, we show that any equilibrium yields
the WMS allocation.
For the first part, again, the strategy of a consumer of type J is to choose ω¯J
2,tˆ
at firm f ∈ K¯J with probability 1/k¯J .
For any t, let ΩFE2,t := (Ω
1
2,t, ...,Ω
n
2,t...,Ω
n+m
2,t ) denote the observed contract of-
fers of all firms, that is initial firms and (potential) entrants. We denote
initial contract offers of all firms that are on the market in t by ΩFE1,t :=
(Ω11, ...,Ω
n
1 ,Ω
n+1
2,t¯n+1 , ...,Ω
n+k
2,t¯n+k
) where t¯n+i < t ∀i = 1, ..., k and denote by Mt
the set of firms on the market in t. We can then denote the history in t by
hFEt = (Ω
FE
1,t ,Ω
FE
2,1 , ...,Ω
FE
2,t−1).
A strategy of a firm f ∈ F specifies a set of contracts in stage 1, and in stage
2, round t, a map from the history to a set of remaining contracts of firm f at
the end of t in stage 2, i.e. αft : h
FE
t 7−→ Ω
f
2,t.
We propose that the equilibrium strategy of any firm f ∈ F specifies the follow-
ing: In stage 1, firm f ∈ F offers Ω1f = ΩWMS ∪ΩRS ∪ΩLR. In stage 2, round t
the strategy of firm f is
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αft (h
FE
t ) =

Ωf2,t−1 if pi
f (ΩFE2,t−1) = 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ΩˆH2,t−1
}
if pif (ΩFE2,t−1) < 0 and pi
f,L(Ω2,t−1) ≥ 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ω¯L2,t−1
}
if pif (ΩFE2,t−1) < 0 and pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) ≥ 0;
Ωf2,t−1 \
{
ω¯H2,t−1, ω¯
L
2,t−1
}
if pif (ΩFE2,t−1) < 0 and
pif,L(ΩFE2,t−1), pi
f,H(ΩFE2,t−1) < 0;
Ω¯f2,t if pi
f (ΩFE2,t−1) > 0.
ΩˆH2,t−1 :=
{
ω ∈ Ωf2,t−1 \ {ΩRS} such that if Ω
j
2,t−1 = {ω} ∀j ∈ C,
then ω = ω¯H2,t−1 and pi
f,H(Ω2,t−1) < 0
}
with C :=
{
f ∈Mt
∣∣∣Ωf1 ,Ωft¯f ⊆ ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR} .
and Ω¯f2,t denotes the largest set of contracts such that for Ω
j
2,t = Ω
j
2,t−1 for all j ∈
F ∪ E \ {f}, then pif (Ω2,t) is maximal.
The strategy of an entrant f ∈ E in stage 2, round t specifies the following: As
long as f has not entered, the strategy consists of a map from the history in t to a
decision to enter the market in round t, i.e. θft : h
FE
t 7−→ η ∈ {entry, noentry}.
When f enters in t, i.e. θft (h
FE
t ) = entry, the strategy specifies a map from the
history to a set of contract offers Ωft , γ
f
t : h
FE
t 7−→ Ω
f
2,t. For all subsequent
rounds t, the strategy specifies a map from the history to a set of remaining
contracts of firm f at the end of t i.e. φft : h
FE
t 7−→ Ω
f
2,t.
We propose that a possible equilibrium strategy of an entrant f ∈ E specifies
the following:
θft (h
FE
t ) =
 entry if pij(ΩFE2,t−1) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ F ∪ E \ f ;noentry otherwise.
γft (h
FE
t ) =

ΩWMS ∪ ΩRS ∪ ΩLR if pi
j(ΩFE
2,t¯f−1
) = 0 for all j ∈ F ∪ E \ f and
C = Mt;
Ω¯f otherwise.
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where Ω¯f denotes the largest set of contracts such that for Ωj
2,t¯f
= Ωj
2,t¯f−1
∀j ∈
F ∪ E \ f , then pif (Ω2,t) is maximal and lastly,
φft (h
FE
t ) = α
f
t (h
FE
t ).
If all initial firms and entrants follow the above respective strategies, no initial
firm withdraws any contract in t = 1 and all entrants enter in t = 1, no firm
withdraws any contract in t = 2 and stage 2 ends after t = 2, firms make zero
expected profit and a customer of type J receives her J-type WMS contract.
It remains to show that there is no profitable deviation. Firstly, note that, for
the same reasoning as in proof of Proposition 1, no initial firm can deviate prof-
itably. Then, assume that an entrant f¯ in t¯f¯ offers Ωf¯
t¯f¯
and has a withdrawal
strategy φˆf¯t and assume that f¯ makes a strictly positive profit. By the strategy
of all firms f ∈ F ∪E \ f¯ , it follows that t¯f¯ ≤ 2. Then, however, independent of
whether t¯f¯ = 1 or t¯f¯ = 2, from the strategy of all firms f ∈ F ∪E \ f¯ it follows
that round t¯f¯ is equivalent to stage 1 in the game without entry. The rest of
the proof corresponds to the proof of Proposition 1.
For the second part of the proof, assume that an equilibrium exists that yields
an allocation different from WMS, i.e. (w¯H
2,tˆ
, w¯L
2,tˆ
) 6= (ωHWMS, ω
L
WMS, ). Since it
is an equilibrium, each firms f ∈ F ∪ E makes a nonnegative expected profit.
Since we specified that if an entrant is indifferent between entering the market
or not, the entrant enters, nonnegative expected profits imply that all firms
f ∈ E enter in some round t < tˆ.
Now since (w¯H
2,tˆ
, w¯L
2,tˆ
) 6= (ωHWMS, ω
L
WMS, ) there exist contracts ωˆ
H , ωˆL such that
uH(ωˆH) ≥ uH(w¯H
2,tˆ
), uH(ωˆH) ≤ uH(ωˆL), uL(ωˆL) > uL(w¯H
2,tˆ
) and for firm fˆ
offering Ωfˆ =
{
ωˆH , ωˆL
}
and attracting the whole population, pifˆ > 0 and
pifˆ ≥
∑
F∪E
pij. As pifˆ ≥
∑
F∪E
pij, an entrant can profitably deviate by waiting
to enter the market until tˆ and offer ωˆH , ωˆL in tˆ. Note that this entry cannot
be prevented by firms as uL(ωˆL) > uL(w¯H
2,tˆ
), i.e. there exists no contract that
cream skims low risks from uL(ωˆL).
4 Endogenous Capital in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz Model
We endogenize upfront capital of insurers in the RS model. Under limited li-
ability, low upfront capital gives rise to an endogenous insolvency risk. This
introduces an externality among customers of an insurer such that an equilib-
rium with the WMS allocation always exists. In this market, solvency regulation
might have unintended consequences: If the required solvency capital is too high,
an equilibrium with a second-best efficient allocation fails to exist.
4.1 Introduction
We propose a basic extension to the RS model to solve the equilibrium existence
problem: Instead of being exogenously endowed with sufficiently high assets as
in RS, insurers choose the level of upfront capital before entering the market
stage. Now under limited liability, low upfront capital gives rise to an endoge-
nous insolvency risk as, depending on contract offers and the distribution of
risk types over the contracts of an insurer, there might not be sufficient assets
to fulfill claims, as in Faynzilberg (2006).22 Generally speaking, this introduces
22 Insolvency has been analyzed in insurance markets without adverse selection. Doherty and
Schlesinger (1990) analyze insurance demand under an exogenous insolvency risk and show
that less than full insurance will be purchased at the actuarially fair premium if default
is total, however, if default is partial, overinsurance might occur and there is generally no
monotonic relationship between default payout rate and insurance coverage. Agarwal and
Ligon (1998) introduce an exogenous default risk into the RS model when consumers have
CARA preferences and apply the Wilson anticipatory equilibrium concept. Comparing
the situation with and without default risk, Agarwal and Ligon (1998) find that high risks
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an externality among customers of a firm as an individual’s expected utility
now does not only depend on contract parameters but also on the distribu-
tion of risk types over the contracts of an insurer. This externality guarantees
equilibrium existence - we show that with capital choice under limited liability,
an equilibrium in pure strategies that yields the second-best efficient Wilson-
Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) allocation always exists. The equilibrium is sustained
as cream-skimming offers aimed at attracting low risk types lead to a deterio-
ration of high risks’ WMS contract due to insolvency when upfront capital is
low. High risks then prefer to choose the deviating contract as well, rendering
the deviation unprofitable. Now in terms of the strategic capital choice of firms,
putting in more capital is not profitable for an insurer as this only increases in-
centives of competitors to cream skim low risks away from this insurer. Hence,
an equilibrium with low upfront capital and the WMS allocation always exists.
One implication of our analysis is that solvency regulation might have unin-
tended consequences: If imposed capital requirements are too strict, a second-
best efficient equilibrium fails to exist.
4.2 The model
There is a continuum of individuals of mass 1 in the market, representing a large
population of consumers. Each individual faces two possible states of nature:
In state 1 no loss occurs and the endowment is w0, in state 2 a loss occurs
and the endowment is w0 − L with w0 > w0 − L > 0. There are 2 types of
individuals, an individual may be a high risk type (H) with loss probability pH ,
or a low-risk type (L) with loss probability pL, with 0 < pL < pH < 1. Indi-
viduals have a twice continuously differentiable strictly concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function v(w). Insurance is provided by firms in the set
F := {1, ..., f, ...m}. Firms are risk neutral and do not know, ex ante, any indi-
vidual’s type.
might be better of with default risk if the Wilson equilibrium changes from separating (no
default) to pooling (default).
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The timing of the market interaction follows RS, i.e. insurers offer contracts
first, then insurees choose. The difference to RS is that while RS assume in-
surers to be exogenously endowed with sufficiently high capital, insurers in this
model choose the level of upfront capital before entering the market stage. Firms
will be subject to limited liability, i.e. if a loss occurs and the insurer does not
have enough assets, full indemnity payment might not be possible. Formally,
the timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 0: The risk type of each individual is chosen by nature. Each individual
has a chance of γ, 0 < γ < 1 to be a H-type, and of (1− γ) to be a L-type.
Stage 1: Each firm f ∈ F decides on the level of its upfront capital Kf .
There are nonnegative opportunity costs to holding capital.23
Stage 2: Each firm f ∈ F offers a finite set of contracts Ωf =
{
ωf1 , ω
f
2 , ..., ω
f
k
}
where a contract ωfl = (P
f
l , I
f
l ) ∈ Ω
f specifies a premium P fl and an indem-
nity Ifl .
24
Stage 3: Individuals choose their insurance contract.25
Stage 4: Losses are realized.
Stage 5: Insurance firms pay out indemnities. If total claims Cf at firm f
are less than total assets Af , the insurance firm fully settles claims. If to-
tal claims Cf exceed total assets Af , then the insurance firm pays out the
assets and defaults on the remaining claims. The ex ante known insolvency
rules specify proportional payout, i.e. a customer at firm f who has bought
contract ωfg and has realized a loss receives a fraction β
f = Af/Cf of her
indemnity claim Ifg .
26
23 Equilibrium existence does not depend on whether opportunity costs of capital are zero
or positive.
24 Each firm cannot offer more than k contracts. We restrict the set of possible contract
offers to Ω := {(P, I)|I ≤ L} where I > L is ruled out for moral hazard considerations.
In this chapter, we change notation for insurance contracts as the analysis of insolvency
is more straightforward when contract paramaters are explicitly expressed as premia and
indemnity payments.
25 An individual can only sign one contract with one firm, i.e. we consider exclusive con-
tracting.
26 We will discuss the effects of alternative insolvency rules in Section 3.
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For expositional convenience, we will henceforth call the subgame starting with
firms’ contract offers in stage 2 the ‘market game’.
Firm assets are comprised of two components: upfront capital and premium
income. When upfront capital is low, depending on the offered contracts and
distribution of agents across the contracts, insolvency might occur. However,
insolvency also determines an agent’s expected utility from chosing a contract
at a specific insurer. Formally, let λfi denote the mass of individuals taking out
contract ωfi ∈ Ω
f and let σfi denote the share of high risks in λ
f
i . Then the
expected utility of a J-type individual J ∈ {H,L} from choosing the contract
ωfi ∈ Ωf , λ
f
i > 0 is
uJ(ωfi , β
f ) := (1− pJ)v(w0 − P
f
i ) + p
Jv(w0 − P
f
i − L+min
{
1, βf
}
Ifi )
where
βf =
Kf +
∑k
i=1 λ
f
i P
f
i∑k
i=1 λ
f
i (p
Hσfi + p
L(1− σfi ))I
f
i
.27
Firms expected profits are given by
pif = max
{
0,
k∑
i=1
λfi (P
f
i − (p
Hσfi + p
L(1− σfi ))I
f
i )
}
.
In the RS model, firms are assumed to be exogenously endowed with sufficient
capital such that insolvency does not occur. The expected utility derived from
a contract then depends solely on the contract parameters. With a slight abuse
of notation, we denote expected utility of a J-type individual from contract wl
in the RS setting with large capital holdings by:
uJ(ωl) := (1− p
J)v(w0 − Pl) + p
Jv(w0 − Pl − L+ Il).
27 i.e. we evoke the law of large numbers to identify the average indemnity at a contract with
the expected indemnity of a customer randomly drawn at the contract. This representation
of expected utility is valid as long as it is not the case that λfi = 0 ∀i. Note that, if λ
f
i = 0
∀i, the expected utility of a customer choosing any contract at firm f is less than her
expected utility from remaining uninsured.
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4.3 Equilibrium with WMS allocation
4.3.1 Market game with no upfront capital
Endogenous insolvency risk will play a key role in the analysis. To analyze the
effect of endogenous insolvency on the expected utility of consumers, we will for
now assume that no firm holds upfront capital, i.e. Kf = 0 ∀f ∈ F . This is
similar to the situation discussed by Faynzilberg (2006). As our approach and
modeling differ, we will derive the results in detail.
Under this assumption, suppose that firm f offers only the H-type WMS con-
tract ωHWMS and attracts all H-types. Then this firm would go insolvent with
final assets of γPωH
WMS
and final claims of γpHIωH
WMS
= γpHL. Thus every in-
sured with a loss obtains PωH
WMS
/pH , so the expected utility of a customer of
firm f is:
uH(ωHWMS, β
f ) = (1− pH)v(w0 − PωH
WMS
) + pHv(w0 − L+
(1− pH)
pH
PωH
WMS
)
Endogenous insolvency in this case lowers the indemnity such that the (H-type)
customer’s indifference curve shifts vertically downward to the point where it
crosses the H-type fair insurance line. To see this, note that, due to insolvency,
the insurer makes exactly zero profits as he pays out the assets and defaults on
the remaining claims; however, the customer always has to pay the premium.
The resulting expected utility is lower than that of the H-type RS contract as
there is no full insurance. This deterioration of the contract is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. We can now state our first result.
Proposition 4.1 Let Kf = 0 ∀f ∈ F . Then there exists a symmetric equi-
librium in the market game where every individual of type J obtains contract
ωJWMS in stage 3 and no insurer goes insolvent.
Proof See Appendix. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 works as follows: As high risks are cross-
subsidized and the WMS contracts maximize low risk utility subject to overall
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w2
w1
uH(ωHWMS , β
f )
uH(ωHWMS)
ωHWMS
Figure 4.1: Contract deterioration with endogenous insolvency risk if a firm
has no upfront capital and only attracts high risk types which buy
ωHWMS
non-negative profits, a deviation has to aim at cream-skimming low risks. That
is an insurer offers a contract in the set ΩCS as shown in Figure 4.2. In the RS
model, this deviation is profitable as high risk’s expected utility is not affected by
cream-skimming. Here however, due to endogenous insolvency risk, a deviation
aimed at cream skimming low risks leads to a contract deterioration for high
risks.28 When they correctly anticipate this contract deterioration, high risks
prefer the deviating contract as well, at least as long as the deviator makes a
profit and does not go insolvent. However, this implies that the deviator will go
insolvent, which renders a deviation unprofitable.
Remark: The result of Proposition 1 does not depend on the particular in-
solvency rule. Instead of the proportional insolvency rule where each customer
receives the same share of her indemnity claim, consider e.g. ex post efficient
rationing: if a loss occurs, each customer experiences the same loss independent
28 In Picard (2009), sharing profits or losses in e.g. a mutual creates an analogous externality.
In Picard (2009) the realized contract for the high risks moves along the diagonal rather
than vertically. This is due as in his case those high risks who do not have a loss have to
pay for those who experience a loss. A similar general logic also applies in Kosfeld and
von Siemens (2009). In a labor market context, Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009) assume
that high productivity workers prefer to be pooled with their own type.
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w2
w1
uH(ωHWMS , β
f )
ΩCS
ωHWMS
Figure 4.2: Cream-skimming and WMS insurer insolvency
of risk type, and thus it is ex post efficient to distribute assets equally among
claimants. Now the expected utility of an H-type from his respective WMS
contract when there is insolvency is never higher with ex post efficient rationing
than with proportional rationing: Either there are only high risk claimants, then
there is no difference, or there are also low risk claimants, but then high risks
are worse of as under proportional rationing they have a higher indemnity claim
and thus payout. As contract deterioration for high risks is the crucial part
that guarantees equilibrium existence, ex post efficient rationing would thus not
affect our results.
Next it is shown that the equilibrium allocation in the market game is unique
if Kf = 0 ∀f ∈ F .
Proposition 4.2 Let Kf = 0 ∀f ∈ F . Any equilibrium of the market game
yields the WMS allocation.
Proof See Appendix. 
The intuition for this result is the following: Suppose an equilibrium exists
with an allocation that is different from WMS. This allocation either involves
nonnegative profits or some insurers go insolvent. In the first case, there is
always a profitable deviating contract menu. In the second case, the allocation
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can be translated to an allocation without insolvency yielding any consumer
the same expected utility and yielding firms zero profits. However, then there
always exists a profitable deviating contract menu as well.
4.3.2 Endogenous capital
So far in the analyis we assumed that capital endowment is exogenous and in
particular that firms do not own any assets. Now we are ready to analyze the
complete game with upfront capital choice.
Proposition 4.3 In the complete game with endogenous capital, an equilibrium
always exists in which Kf = 0 ∀ f ∈ F , every individual of type J obtains
contract ωJWMS in stage 3 and no insurer goes insolvent.
Proof See Appendix. 
From Propositions 1 and 2 we know that if firms do not hold any capital, an
equilibrium with the WMS allocation exists and is generically unique. Now
consider the following strategy: firm f sets zero upfront capital in stage 1. If
firm f observes that all firms set zero capital, then f offers the WMS contracts
in stage 2. If a firm j 6= f chooses a nonzero amount of capital, f still offers
WMS contracts. If every firm follows this strategy, a deviator who chooses a
different level of capital cannot make a positive profit for exactly the reasoning
laid out in Proposition 1: Since high risks’ WMS contracts would deteriorate if
the deviator tries to cream skim low risks, high risks would choose the deviat-
ing contract offer, rendering it unprofitable. This reasoning holds as every firm
except possibly the deviator does not hold any upfront capital.
Remark: We consider upfront capital choice but do not model the possibility
to recapitalize ex post if claims exceed assets. However, note that, for the same
reasoning that makes it unattractive for an insurer to put in upfront capital, an
insurer does not have any incentive to commit to a recapitalization policy.
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4.4 Solvency regulation
Insurance markets are subject to regulation. While regulation traditionally tar-
geted the product level directly, e.g. via regulation of premia, liberalisation in
the 1970’s triggered a shift towards solvency requirements as the main regulatory
tool. Solvency regulation itself saw a change from volume-based to risk-based
solvency requirements in most major regulatory jurisdictions since the 1990’s,
more recently in Europe with Solvency II underway.29 Although the aim of
Solvency II is to ensure risk management that better fits an individual insurer’s
risk, practitioners argue that it will increase solvency capital requirements for
most lines of business.30
The economic effects of solvency regulation have so far only been analyzed in
insurance markets without adverse selection. Rees, Gravelle, and Wambach
(1999) show that there is no efficiency rationale for solvency regulation when
consumers are fully informed about the insurer’s insolvency risk such that the
role of regulation should consist in providing information rather than imposing
capital requirements. However, when there is asymmetric information, we will
show that if solvency capital requirements are too strong, regulation may actu-
ally impede the existence of a second-best efficient equilibrium.
For the analysis, assume that solvency regulation requires each firm to hold a
minimum capital K∗ at the beginning of stage 1. Let Kˆ be implicitly defined
by
(1− pH)v(w0 − PωH
WMS
) + pHv(w0 − L+
Kˆ
γpH
+
(1− pH)
pH
PωH
WMS
) = uH(ωLCS)
where ωLCS = (PLCS, ILCS) is the unique contract that satisfies
PLCS = p
LILCS
uL(ωLCS) = u
L(ωLWMS),
29 See e.g. Eling and Holzmuller (2008).
30 In a recent Economist article, an analyst at JPmorgan claimed that “the rules could
increase the amount of capital that insurers need to hold by as much as 75 %”.
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i.e. in the set of cream skimming contracts that contract which is worst for a
high risk type when there is no insolvency. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
w2
w1
ωLCS
ΩCS
uH(ωHLCS)
Figure 4.3: Contract deterioration if a firm has capital Kˆ and only attracts
high risk types which buy ωHWMS
Corollary 4.1 When solvency regulation requires firms to hold capital K∗ > Kˆ,
an equilibrium with the WMS allocation fails to exist.
Proof See Appendix. 
When firms hold sufficiently large upfront capital, the high risk type WMS
contract does not deteriorate strongly when there is a cream-skimming devia-
tion. Hence, high risks might not opt for the deviating contract such that there
are profitable deviations attracting only low risks. This impedes the existence
of an equilibrium in pure strategies with the WMS allocation. Although we
have concentrated on the WMS allocation, from standard reasoning it is easy
to show that there is no equilibrium yielding a second-best efficient allocation.
Thus, if there is adverse selection, ensuring solvency via regulation is not a
good consumer protection policy as the externality from contracting disappears
if solvency capital is too high.
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4.5 Conclusion
To address the equilibrium non-existence result in competitive insurance mar-
kets with asymmetric information, we modify the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
model by allowing insurers to decide on the level of upfront capital and possi-
bly go insolvent. This introduces an externality among the customers of a firm
that guarantees equilibrium existence: An equilibrium with the second-best
efficient Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence allocation always exists. In such a market,
cream-skimming becomes unattractive as an insurer trying to attract low risks
has to fear attracting high risks as well since the high risks’ contract at another
insurer deteriorates if low risks do not buy from that particular insurer. When
insurers choose the level of their upfront capital, this externality is present be-
cause any insurer will opt for a low amount of capital simply because putting
in more capital only increases the incentive of competitors to engage in cream
skimming. Interestingly, solvency regulation aiming at minimizing insolvency
risk leads to unintended consequences: If imposed solvency capital requirements
are too strong, the externality from contracting disappears and there is no equi-
librium with a second-best efficient allocation.
4.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
We claim that a possible equilibrium strategy of firms is to offer both WMS
contracts each. For the case that all firms f ∈ F offer
{
ωHWMS, ω
L
WMS
}
, the
strategy of a J-type individual specifies to choose ωJWMS at firm f ∈ F with
probability 1/k. Then no individual has an incentive to deviate, as no insolvency
occurs and all are served with the best possible contract on offer. It remains to
show that there is no profitable firm deviation. Consider the case that all firms
follow the above strategy apart from firm f¯ which offers Ωf¯ =
{
ωf¯1 , ω
f¯
2 , ..., ω
f¯
k
}
.
We will proceed in two steps. We will first show that there is no profitable
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deviation if f¯ does not offer a cream-skimming contract. We will then show
that f¯ offering a cream-skimming contract cannot be a profitable deviation
either.
Assume that f¯ is making a strictly positive profit.
For the first part, assume that Ωf¯ ∩ ΩCS = ∅ where ΩCS is defined as follows
ΩCS :=
{
ω ∈ Ω|uL(ω) ≥ uL(ωLWMS) and u
H(ω) ≤ uH(ωLWMS)
}
i.e. ΩCS is the cream-skimming region with respect to the WMS contracts as
displayed in Figure 3.31 There are two possible cases:
Case 1 : There exists a contract ω ∈ Ωf¯ such that uL(ω) > uL(ωLWMS). Since
Ωf¯ ∩ΩCS = ∅, this implies that u
H(ω) > uH(ωHWMS) as well. Then, both L- and
H-types would choose the deviating contract offer.32 However, by construction
of the WMS contracts, there is no contract (set) preferred by both types to the
WMS contracts that is profitable.
Case 2 : There does not exist a contract ω ∈ Ωf¯ such that uL(ω) > uL(ωLWMS).
Then, no L-type chooses a contract offer of the deviator. As no L-type deviates,
no WMS insurer goes insolvent. However, then either uH(ω) < uH(ωHWMS), i.e.
there is no customer at f¯ or uH(ω) ≥ uH(ωHWMS) and some H-types choose the
deviating contract. However, in this latter case, as no L-type deviates, f¯ would
not be making a strictly positive profit.
Now, the more interesting part, assume that Ωf¯ ∩ ΩCS 6= ∅. We will consider
three cases.
Case 1: WMS insurers do not sell any contract.
As Ωf¯∩ΩCS 6= ∅, each type prefers taking a contract at f¯ to remaining uninsured.
However, since Ωf¯ ∩ΩCS 6= ∅ and Ω
f¯ 6=
{
ωHWMS, ω
L
WMS
}
, by construction of the
WMS contracts f¯ cannot be making a strictly positive profit when attracting
the whole population.
31 Note that ΩCS includes ω
L
WMS and contracts that, under solvency, give the L-types the
same expected utility as ωLWMS .
32 Note that, as uH(ωHWMS) ≥ u
H(ωHWMS , β) and u
L(ωLWMS) ≥ u
L(ωLWMS , β), this is true
irrespective of WMS insurer insolvency, i.e. for any possible β of WMS insurers.
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Case 2: WMS insurers sell contracts and there is no insolvency.
As Ωf¯ ∩ΩCS 6= ∅, there exists a contract ω
f¯
i such that u
L(ωf¯i ) ≥ u
L(ωLWMS) and
uH(ωf¯i ) ≤ u
H(ωHWMS). Then some L-types deviate from ω
L
WMS. It follows that
either WMS insurers make losses, which is ruled out by assumption, or some
H-types deviate as well. For some H-types to deviate as well, a contract ωf¯j
such that uH(ωf¯j ) ≥ u
H(ωHWMS) has to exist. However, by construction of the
WMS contracts, there is no profitable contract set preferred by both types to
the WMS contracts, hence f¯ does not make strictly positive profit.
Case 3: Some WMS insurers go insolvent with positive proability.
As Ωf¯ ∩ ΩCS 6= ∅, there exists a contract ω
f¯
i such that u
L(ωf¯i ) ≥ u
L(ωLWMS)
and uH(ωf¯i ) ≤ u
H(ωHWMS). Now as u
L(ωf¯i ) ≥ u
L(ωLWMS) ≥ u
L(ωLWMS, β) for
any β ≤ 1, it is optimal for an L-type to choose the deviating offer if uL(ωf¯i ) >
uL(ωLWMS, β) and it is optimal to either choose the deviating offer or the L-type
WMS contract if uL(ωf¯i ) = u
L(ωLWMS, 1). We define the consumer strategy such
that the deviating contract offer is chosen. Hence, all L-types deviate. As all
L-types deviate, the H-type WMS contract at WMS insurers deteriorates such
that ∀f ∈ Fˆ
uH(ωHWMS, β
f ) = (1−pH)v(w−PωH
WMS
)+pHv(w−L+
(1− pH)
pH
PωH
WMS
) < uH(ωHRS).
As uH(ωHWMS, β
f ) < uH(ωHRS) ∀f ∈ Fˆ , it follows that u
H(ωf¯i ) ≥ u
H(ωHWMS, β
f ),
∀f ∈ Fˆ by construction of the WMS contracts: The WMS contracts maxi-
mize L-type utility. Hence when they do not coincide with the RS contracts,
uL(ωLWMS) > u
L(ωLRS). As u
H(ωHRS) = u
H(ωLRS) and using that H-type indiffer-
ence curves are less steep than L-type indifference curves in the two-states wealth
space, this implies that uH(ωf¯i ) ≥ u
H(ωHRS) and thus u
H(ωf¯i ) ≥ u
H(ωHWMS, β
f )
∀f ∈ Fˆ . Then all H-types would choose the deviating offer.33 However, since
all types deviate, this contradicts the assumption that some WMS insurers go
insolvent.
33 Note that expected utility for H-types at a WMS insurer would even be lower if some or
all take out the L-type WMS contract.
56 Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose that an equilibrium exists that does not yield the WMS allocation.
From the set of equilibrium contracts, select A =
{
ω¯H , ω¯L
}
with34
ω¯H ∈ arg max
ω
j
i∈
⋃
Ωf
uH(ωji , β¯
j)
ω¯L ∈ arg max
ω
j
i∈
⋃
Ωf
uL(ωji , β¯
j)
and Iω¯H ≥ Iω˜H ∀ ω˜
H ∈ arg max
ω
j
i∈
⋃
Ωf
uH(ωji , β¯
j)
Iω¯L ≥ Iω˜L ∀ ω˜
L ∈ arg max
ω
j
i∈
⋃
Ωf
uL(ωji , β¯
j)
j, k ∈ F and ω¯H 6= ωHWMS and ω¯
L 6= ωLWMS. From the set of equilibrium
contracts, we select the H-type and L-type contracts that have the highest
indemnity. These are precisely the contracts that yield insurers the highest per
contract profit. We distinguish 2 cases:
Case 1: All insurers make nonnegative profits if the allocation is A.
Now as insurers make nonnegative profits, β¯j = 1∀j ∈ F and uJ(ω¯J , β¯) =
uJ(ω¯J). As ω¯H 6= ωHWMS and ω¯
L 6= ωLWMS, there exist contracts ωˆ
H , ωˆL such
that uH(ωˆH) ≥ uH(ω¯H), uH(ωˆH) ≤ uH(ωˆL), uL(ωˆL) > uL(ω¯L) and for firm
fˆ offering Ωfˆ =
{
ωˆH , ωˆL
}
and attracting the whole population, pifˆ > 0 and
pifˆ ≥
∑
F pi
j. As pifˆ > 0, a deviating insurer offering ωˆH , ωˆL would not go
insolvent and all types would choose their respective deviating offer. Hence,
there is a profitable deviation and A cannot be an equilibrium allocation.
Case 2: Some insurers go insolvent if the allocation is A.
As some insurers make negative profits, there is insolvency. Now since A are
equilibrium contracts and customers take insolvency into account, i.e. they
maximize expected utility with insolvency, A can be converted to a contract
set B =
{
ωˇH , ωˇL
}
without insolvency providing individuals the same expected
utility and yielding zero expected profit for insurers with IωˇH = β¯jI
j
ω¯H
and
IωˇL = β¯kI
k
ω¯L
. Now we can apply the reasoning from Case 1 above to show that
34 It might well be the case that ω¯H and ω¯L coincide.
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there is a profitable deviation.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We claim that a possible equilibrium strategy is the following: Firm f sets
K = 0 in stage 0. In stage 1, if Kj = 0 ∀j ∈ F , firm f sets both WMS con-
tracts. If Kf > 0 and Kj = 0 ∀j 6= f , then firm f sets the RS contracts. If
K l > 0, l 6= f and Kj = 0 ∀j 6= l, firm f sets both WMS contracts.35 For
the case that all firms f ∈ F offer
{
ωHWMS, ω
L
WMS
}
in stage 2, the strategy of a
J-type individual specifies to choose ωJWMS at firm f ∈ F with probability 1/k.
Then no individual has an incentive to deviate, as no insolvency occurs and all
are served with the best possible contract on offer. Firms make zero expected
profits. It remains to show that there is no profitable firm deviation. Consider
the case that all firms follow the above strategy apart from firm f¯ which sets
K f¯ ≥ 0 and offers Ωf¯ =
{
ωf¯1 , ω
f¯
2 , ..., ω
f¯
k
}
.
Now, as all firms f ∈ F \ f¯ set both WMS contracts each, a profitable deviation
has to involve cream-skimming, as shown in proof of Proposition 1. However, as
also Kf = 0 ∀f ∈ F \ f¯ , cream-skimming is not profitable for f¯ for any K f¯ ≥ 0
following the reasoning laid out in proof of Proposition 1. Hence, there is no
profitable deviation.
Proof of Corollary 1.
Let required upfront capital be K∗ > Kˆ for any firm operating in the market
and assume an equilibrium exists that yields the WMS allocation. Then, there
is at least one insurer who offers both WMS contracts, hereafter called a WMS
insurer, sells contracts to both risk types and does not go insolvent.
Now consider contract ω¯ ∈ ΩCS with u
L(ω¯) > uL(ωLWMS) and
uH(ω¯) < (1− pH)v(w0 − PωH
WMS
) + pHv(w0 − L+
K∗
γpH
+
(1− pH)
pH
PωH
WMS
)
35 A complete specification of the strategy includes the contract sets by firm f if two or more
firms choose Kj > 0 at stage 1. As this is not required for the existence proof, we do not
specify the strategy further.
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i.e. contract ω¯ is preferred by L-types over their respective WMS contract even
without WMS insurer insolvency but not preferred by H-types over their re-
spective WMS contract even if there is WMS insurer insolvency. As K∗ > Kˆ,
such a contract exists. Now consider a firm offering ω¯. As uL(ω¯) > uL(ωLWMS),
all L-types prefer ω¯ to their respective WMS contract at the WMS insurer. As
uH(ω¯) < (1−pH)v(w0−PωH
WMS
)+pHv(w0−L+
K∗
γpH
+ (1−p
H)
pH
PωH
WMS
), all H-types
at the WMS insurer prefer to be insured with the WMS insurer and would not
choose ω¯. A firm offering ω¯ would thus attract L-types and make a positive
expected profit. However, then the WMS insurer does not sell contracts to both
risk types, which is a contradiction.
5 Asymmetric Information and
Collusive Stability
We compare the stability of collusive agreements in adverse selection insurance
markets under symmetric and asymmetric information. We show that asym-
metric information weakly destabilizes collusion. This is not a consequence of
asymmetric information per se, but of the common value characteristic of this
market. We furthermore analyze the effect of consumer information about their
risk type on collusive stability. Generally, there is a non-monotonous relation-
ship between consumer information and collusive stability under asymmetric
information.
5.1 Introduction
Although a large theoretical literature is devoted to the study of competition in
insurance markets under averse selection, the literature on oligopoly models is
scarce.36 Therefore, in this chapter, we depart from the assumption of compe-
tition and analyze the ability of insurance firms to engage in collusive behavior.
In particular, we analyze whether asymmetric information impacts collusive sta-
bility, i.e. whether collusion is more or less stable in adverse selection insurance
markets under symmetric or asymmetric information. There are several inter-
pretations for the comparative statics that we consider: the first one is across
insurance markets, i.e. asymmetric information might be less important in some
36 An exception is Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez (2007) in which horizontally differentiated
health plans are considered.
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markets, as e.g. risk types are strongly correlated with (collectible) observables,
but that it is more prevalent in other insurance markets. Another interpretation
might be the introduction of a data collection or information technique in a par-
ticular market such that asymmetric information is lessened. An example are
genetic tests, which can be requested by insurers depending on the regulatory
environment.
To analyze the impact of asymmetric information on collusive stability, an in-
finitely repeated version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model is consid-
ered. Under symmetric information, the analysis mirrors analysis of a standard
Bertrand market, with the only exception that insurers offer nonlinear contract
menus. However, under asymmetric information, deviation incentives and thus
the stability of collusion depend on the shares of risk types in the population: If
there are only a few high risk type, perfect collusion implies that high risks are
cross-subsidized as firms want to extract a large surplus from the large share of
low risks. Then, a deviator does not deviate on the complete set of collusive
contracts, but only cream-skims low risks, thereby earning higher than total
collusive profits which destabilizes collusion.
This effect can be particularly pronounced if there are consumers that do not
have precise information abour their risk type. We show that collusion is desta-
bilized under asymmetric information if there are only a few consumers informed
about their risk type, even if the share of high risks is relatively high. Gener-
ally, the impact of information about risk type on collusive stability is non-
monotonous.
On a general note, we thus contribute to the theory of collusion in terms of
providing a new factor that destabilizes collusion: common values in asymmet-
ric information markets.37 Note that it is not asymmetric information per se
that destabilizes collusion: In a standard private value asymmetric information
case a` la Maskin and Riley (1984), asymmetric information does not destabilize
37 Furthermore, note that in contrast to previous work on asymmetry of information in the
context of collusion in which the asymmetric information is between colluding firms, either
in the form of moral hazard (Green and Porter, 1984) or adverse selection (Athey, Bagwell,
and Sanchirico, 2004), we consider firm-symmetric asymmetric information.
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collusion, as although collusive profits are always lower due to incentive compat-
ibility, relative deviation incentives are not affected by private value asymmetric
information. That is because under private values each type at worst yields zero
profits, but there is never cross-subsidization.
Interestingly, in the insurance literature, the term collusion is generally not
used to describe collusive practices in the sense of sustaining above Nash profits
through cooperation in an infinite horizon setting, but to describe fraudulent
behavior of a coalition of insurees and service providers vis-a`-vis the insurer.38
The lack of collusion models is striking as insurance markets has seen quite a
few cases of cartel behavior over the past years. For example, the German mar-
ket for industrial insurance was cartelized by a group of 17 companies.39 The
German Antitrust Authority looked into the market in 2002 and 2003 to find
evidence that the insurance companies had been colluding since 1999. The firms
had come to the agreement to, among others, stop competing with respect to
prices as well as terms and conditions.40 The firms as well as 23 representatives
involved were found guilty and fined an amount of around € 140 million, the
companies as well as their representatives ultimately accepted to pay this fine in
2010.41 Another example is the well known so-called liability crisis that hit the
insurance market in the mid-1980s and is often associated with collusive activ-
ity.42 This crisis was characterized by a sharp increase in insurance premiums,
cancellations of policies and massive withdrawal of insurers from some lines.43
Attornies general in 19 states in the US filed charges against several insurance
companies which faced claims to have been involved in “a ‘global conspiracy’ to
limit or exclude certain types of liability coverage in an effort to cut competition,
38 See e.g. Alger and Ma (2003) and Bourgeon, Picard, and Pouyet (2008). To our knowledge,
the only study besides ours on collusion between insurers is Kesternich and Schumacher
(2009), in which the focus is on stability of pooling under symmetric information.
39 The following is based on Bundeskartellamt (2010) (Bundeskartellamt, 2010, Fallbericht:
Ende des OLG-Verfahrens wegen der Bußgelder gegen Industrieversicherer).
40 Another aspect had been the improvement of the communication among cartel members.
41 Note that insurance markets are however exempt from competition law in several ways:
there is e.g. a block exemption in European competition law allowing insurers to share
information.
42 See, e.g. Angoff (1988).
43 See Winter (1991).
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increase prices, and make those who purchase policies pay more for less”.44
Furthermore, Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie´, and Salanie´ (2006) analyze French
automobile insurance and point out that a deeper data analysis suggests that
profits are higher for contracts with higher coverage, which is contrary to pre-
dictions of competitive models. We now turn to the model.
5.2 The model
Consider a discrete time setting, t = 1, 2, ...,∞. In each period t, a continuum
of individuals of mass 1, representing a large population of consumers, enters
the market. Each individual faces two possible states of nature: In state 1 no
loss occurs and the endowment is w0, in state 2 a loss occurs and the endowment
is w0 − l with w0 > w0 − L > 0. There are 2 types of individuals, an individual
may be a high risk type (H) with loss probability pH , or a low-risk type (L)
with loss probability pL, with 0 < pL < pH < 1. Individuals have a twice
continuously differentiable strictly concave von Neumann Morgenstern utility
function v(w). Individuals purchase insurance for one period and then exit the
market. Insurance is provided by risk neutral firms in the set F := {1, 2}, the
firms’ common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).
The stage game in each period t is the static game underlying the analysis in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) with contract menus: First, the risk type of each
individual is chosen by nature. Each individual has a chance of γ, 0 < γ < 1 to
be a H-type, and of (1−γ) to be a L-type. Then, each firm f ∈ F can offer a set
of contracts Ωf from the set of possible contract offers Ω := {(P, I)|I + P ≤ L}
where a contract (P, I) specifies a premium P and a net indemnity I.45 Finally,
consumers choose an insurance contract. We denote
w1(P ) = w0 − P
w2(I) = w0 − l + I
44 See Reske (1993).
45 I +P > L is ruled out for moral hazard considerations. In this chapter, we define I as the
net indemnity as this facilitates the analysis of optimal contracts lateron.
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Expected utility of customer J ∈ {L,H} from contract (P, I) is
uJ(P, I) = (1− pJ)v(w1(P )) + p
Jv(w2(I))
We will consider two informational settings: Symmetric information and asym-
metric information, i.e. firms do not know, ex ante, any individual’s type in any
period t.
To illustrate the results we use an example throughout the paper. In the exam-
ple, v(w) = ln(w), pH = 1/4, pL = 1/8, l = 1 and w0 = 4.
5.3 Analysis
We will analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion at maximal
profits. We consider grim trigger strategies as defined by Friedman (1971), i.e.
the strategy specifies that after a deviation firms revert to the Nash equilibrium
of the static game for all subsequent periods.46 Let piD denote deviation profits,
piC the per period profit of a firm from collusion and piN the profit from Nash
play in the static game. Then, collusion is stable if
piC
1− δ
≥ piD +
δpiN
1− δ
i.e. if the discounted profits from collusion are higher than the profits from a
one shot deviation followed by discounted profits from the punishment phase.
Solving for δ gives the critical discount factor δ¯ such that for δ ≥ δ¯ collusion is
stable:
δ¯ :=
piD − piC
piD − piN
In the following, we will derive the respective profits for all three cases.
46 We will show below that this corresponds to an optimal penal code.
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Punishment profits
As discussed in chapter 2, an equilibrium in pure strategies might not exist. If
a (Nash-)equilibrium in pure strategies exists, firms offer the separately zero-
profit making RS contracts. However, even if an equilibrium in pure strategies
fails to exist, Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) have shown that an equilibrium in
mixed strategies always exists. In particular, firms mix between jointly zero-
profit contract menus such that the equilibrium in mixed strategies yields zero
expected profits to firms. Since we analyze collusion, we are not interested in
the exact characterization of potential punishment contracts, we only note that
a Nash equilibrium in the one stage game exists that yields zero expected profits
to firms.
Remark 5.1 For any share of high risk types in the population, a Nash equilib-
rium exists in the static game. Firms earn zero expected profits in equilibrium.
In chapter 2 we discussed that mixed strategies might not be the best description
of insurance markets. In this chapter we refer to Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
merely out of simplicity: The relevant aspect is that an equilibrium exists that
yields zero profits. Since the extensions of the RS model as well yield equilibria
with zero profits, we use the simplest possible version to describe the market.
Note furthermore that, since the Nash equilibrium in the static game yields zero
expected profits, grim-trigger strategies correspond to an optimal penal code.
Collusive profits
Since we want to analyse perfect collusion, i.e. collusion at maximal profits, let
us review the monopoly solution. Under symmetric information, a monopolist
fully insures each type such that they are indifferent to not purchasing insurance,
i.e. the monopolist’s profit per customer is just that customer’s risk premium.
Formally, total monopoly profits are
piMS = γr
H + (1− γ)rL
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where rJ is implicitly defined by
v(w0 − p
J l − rJ) = uJ(0, 0)
Note that, contrary to standard monopoly models, first-best profit is not neces-
sarily increasing in type as the risk premium first increases but then decreases
in risk type. Monopoly contracts are shown below in Figure 5.1.
w2
w1
w0 − l
w0
uL
uH
ωLM,s
ωHM,s
Figure 5.1: Monopoly contracts under symmetric information
Stiglitz (1977) gives the first characterization of the monopoly solution under
asymmetric information. For analytical simplicity, we use the approach in Szalay
(2008) and let insurers offer utility contracts. Therefore, let vL1 ≡ v(w1(P
L))
and vL2 ≡ v(w2(I
L)) and so forth where (PL, IL) is the contract intended for the
L-type. We denote by v01 ≡ v(w) and v
0
2 ≡ v(w − l) state-contingent utility in
case of no insurance. Furthermore z ≡ v−1 is the inverse of v.47 A monopolistic
insurer solves the following maximization problem:
max
vL
1
,vL
2
,vH
1
,vH
2
γ(w − pH l − (1− pH)z(v1)
H − pHz(vH2 ))+
(1− γ)(w − pLl − (1− pL)z(vL1 − p
Lz(vL2 ))
47 The inverse exists as v(w) is strictly increasing, z′ > 0 and z′′ > 0 from concavity of v.
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s.t.
(1− pH)vH1 + p
HvH2 ≥ (1− p
H)vL1 + p
HvL2
(1− pL)vL1 + p
LvL2 ≥ (1− p
L)vH1 + p
LvH2
(1− pH)vH1 + p
HvH2 ≥ (1− p
H)v01 + p
Hv02
(1− pL)vL1 + p
LvL2 ≥ (1− p
H)v01 + p
Hv02
Monopoly contracts are separating and high-risk types are always fully insured,
however low-risk types might not receive insurance at all. With the indirect
utility approach, Szalay (2008) shows that optimal contracts, whenever both
types receive insurance, are characterized by
v∗H1 = v
∗H
2
1
v′(z(v∗H2 ))
=
1− γ
γ
pL(1− pL)
pH − pL
[
1
v′(z(v∗L1 ))
−
1
v′(z(v∗L2 ))
]
and that dv∗H1
dγ
=
dv∗H2
dγ
< 0
What is more interesting for the analysis of collusion is that a monopolist might
make losses on the H-type insurance contract. This is the case if the optimal
menu specifies that the H-type utility is larger than H-type utility from the
respective zero-profit making Rothschild-Stiglitz contract. For this to occur,
types have to be sufficiently distinct such that the optimal L-type contract for
γ = 0 yields an H-type a higher utility than the H-type Rothschild-Stiglitz
contract:
Assumption 5.1 pH − pL > rL/l.
Under Assumption 1, we can use the first order conditions and binding con-
straints to determine the share ofH-types such that the optimalH-type contract
corresponds to the H-type full insurance zero profit-making Rothschild-Stiglitz
contract when both types buy insurance. This is the case for γ = γˆ with
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γˆ
1− γˆ
=
pL(1− pL)
pH − pL
[
z′(c(v(w − pH l)))− z
′(a(c(v(w − pH l))))
z′(v(w − pH l))
]
where
a(x) ≡ v02 +
1− pL
pL
(v01 − x)
c(x) ≡
pH
pH − pL
uL(v0)−
pL
pH − pL
x
Then, since
dv∗H
2
dγ
< 0, the H-type contract will yield losses to the monopolist
for all γ < γˆ. From concavity of v, γˆ < 1 always holds and 0 < γˆ follows from
Assumption 1.
That even a monopolist might have to incur losses on a type is a result of the
common value characteristic of this market: For a given contract, the profit
from that contract depends on the type who takes up the contract, which is not
the case in standard private value models of asymmetric information. Now if
the share of low risks is high such that the monopolist tries to extract a large
profit from these low risks, the corresponding incentive compatible high risk
contract is loss-making. Monopoly contracts under asymmetric information for
γ < γˆ are shown below in Figure 5.2.
w2
w1
w0 − l
w0
uL
uH
ωLM,as
ωHM,as
Figure 5.2: Monopoly contracts under asymmetric information for γ < γˆ
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Furthermore, monopoly profits per risk type under symmetric and asymmetric
information are shown in Figure 5.3 the example in which γˆ = 0.15920. The
thick (thin) solid line corresponds to the profit on H-types under asymmetric
(symmetric) information, and the thick dashed (thin dashed) line corresponds
to profit on L-types uner asymmetric (symmetric) information.
–0.005
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
γ
0
0
1
Figure 5.3: Monopoly profits per risk type under symmetric and asymmetric
information
Deviation profits
Under symmetric information, since collusive contracts are such that each con-
tract is separately profit-making for any γ ∈ [0, 1], a deviator would slightly
undercut each monopoly contract separately and earn monopoly profits by de-
viating. Hence, as in the standard Bertrand case, we have piDs (γ) = 2pi
C
s (γ) for
all γ ∈ [0, 1].
Now under asymmetric information, as long as a monopolist makes profits on all
offered contracts separately, i.e. if γ ≥ γˆ, a deviator would again slightly under-
cut each contract separately and earn monopoly profits by deviating. However,
if γ < γˆ, since a monopolist has to incur losses on high-risk types, a deviator
would not deviate on all collusive contracts, but instead only cream skim low
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risks, earning higher than total collusive profits in the deviation period. We
thus have piDas(γ) = 2pi
C
as(γ) for all γ ∈ [γˆ, 1] and pi
D
as(γ) = pi
L
M,as > 2pi
C
as(γ) for
all γ ∈ [0, γˆ) where piLM,as denotes monopoly profits on low risk types.
Stability of collusion
Since under symmetric information piDs (γ) = 2pi
C
s (γ) for all γ ∈ [0, 1] and pun-
ishment profits are zero, it follows that collusion at maximal profits can be sus-
tained as a subgame perfect equilibrium for allγ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if δ ∈ [1/2, 1].
Note that this is true irrespective of whether it is a high or low risk that yields
higher profit to a monopolist, i.e. has a higher risk premium.
Under asymmetric information, since piDas(γ) = 2pi
C
as(γ) for all γ ∈ [γˆ, 1] and
piDas(γ) = pi
L
M,as > 2pi
C
as(γ) for all γ ∈ [0, γˆ) and punishment profits are as well
zero, it follows that collusion at maximal profits can be sustained as a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for all γ ∈ [γˆ, 1] if and only if δ ∈ (1/2, 1) and for all
γ ∈ [0, γˆ) if and only if δ ∈ [δˆ, 1] with δˆ > 1/2. This establishes our first result:
Proposition 5.1 Collusion under asymmetric information is weakly less stable
than collusion under symmetric information.
Proof Follows immediately from comparison of the critical discount factors.
Let us stress again that it is not asymmetric information and thus incentive
compatibility constraints per se that destabilizes collusion, but common values
combined with asymmetric information: Both in private and common value con-
texts, asymmetric information lowers monopoly and thus profits from perfect
collusion. However, only under common values asymmetric information changes
deviation incentives: Cross-subsidization occurs in perfect collusion, and thus
the ratio between deviation and collusive profits increases under common val-
ues, whereas under private values profit from every type is nonnegative such
that relative deviation incentives are not affected.48
48 Although we consider the particular example of an insurance market, the above logic can
easily be extended to other common value markets.
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So far, we only consider a two-type distribution. Chade and Schlee (2008)
characterize the monopoly solution in adverse selection insurance markets for
an arbitrary type set Θ ⊂ (0, 1) and a general cumulative distribution function
on it. Chade and Schlee (2008) show that, as for the two-type case, monotonicity
holds, i.e. indemnity and premium increase in risk type, the highest risk type
receives full coverage, there is no pooling at the top, and if there is exclusion,
then it is low risks that are excluded. From analogous reasoning as in the two-
type case, as incentive compatibility has to hold for the optimal menu, if the
distribution function on the type set specifies that the mass of low enough risk
types is sufficiently high, some of the highest risk types will be cross-subsidized
in the optimal menu. Then, our reasoning holds that collusion under asymmetric
information is (weakly) less stable.
Hence, access to information means good news for the insurance companies not
just because this yields overall higher profits under collusion, but also because
it stabilizes the collusive agreement.
5.4 Consumer information and collusive
stability
So far, we have assumed that consumers are perfectly informed about their risk
type. However, not all consumers might have that information. In this section,
we will analyze the impact of consumer information about their risk type on
collusive stability. A simple example is the health insurance and related markets
with the recent availability of genetic tests. With genetic tests, customers have
a higher precision of information about their risk type. We will analyze whether
collusion is more or less stable when the share of informed customers, i.e. in the
example customers that have genetic information available, increases. To this
end, consider the following change in the stage game:
There is a continuum of individuals of mass 1, representing a large population
of consumers. There are three types of customers, as before H,L but also U .
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Type U customers do not know whether they are high or low risk. The share of
uninformed U -types in the population is denoted by β, as before γ is the share
of H-types among the (1 − β) informed customers. Furthermore, γ is also the
probability of a U -type to be a high risk. The loss probability of U is therefore
given by pU = γpH + (1− γ)pL. As in the baseline case in which all customers
are informed, there is no possibility to signal either risk type or informational
status. We also abstract from endogenous information acquisition, i.e. we will
not analyze whether U -types have an incentive to acquire information. Rather,
we assume that the share of informed customers is exogenously given and does
not depend on available insurance contracts.49
Punishment profits
As for the two-type case, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies might not exist.
If it exists, in analogy to the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium, H-types are fully
insured at their fair premium, and U - and L-types are partially insured at
their respective fair premiums such that contracts are incentive compatible such
that firms make zero expected profits. An equilibrium in pure strategies might
not exist as, depending on the share of informed customers and the share of
high risks in the population, there might be e.g. profitable pooling devations
attracting U - and L-types, H- and U -types or even all 3 types. However, as
in the two-type case, we can appeal to Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to argue
that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and that mixing is necessarily
between jointly zero-profit making contract menus. Thus a Nash equilibrium
always exists and yields zero-expected profits to firms.
Collusive profits
Under symmetric information, analogous to the two-type case, the monopolist
offers each type a contract that extracts their risk premium. Total collusive
profits are then
49 For an analysis of incentives to acquire information and welfare consequences, see e.g.
Doherty and Thistle (1996).
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piMS = β(γr
H + (1− γ)rL) + (1− β)rU
where rU is implicitly defined by
v(w0 − (γp
H + (1− γ)pL)L− rU) = uU(ω0)
Note that, ∂piMS
∂β
= (γrH + (1− γ)rL)− rU
i.e. since r is concave in risk type, a monopolist does not necessarily prefer
informed customers.
Let us turn to asymmetric information. We will consider the case of full asym-
metric information, i.e. insurers do not know risk types, and insurers as well
do not know whether a customer is informed or not, i.e. they do not know
informational status. A monopolistic insurer solves the following maximization
problem:
max
vL
1
,vL
2
,vH
1
,vH
2
,vU
1
,vU
2
(1− β)
[
w − pU l − (1− pU)z(vU1 )− p
Uz(vU2 )
]
+
β
[
γ(w − pH l − (1− pH)z(vH1 )− p
Hz(vH2 )+
(1− γ)(w − pLl − (1− pL)z(vL1 )− p
Lz(vL2 ))
s.t.
(1− pj)vj1 + p
jvj2 ≥ (1− p
j)vj
′
1 + p
jvj
′
2 ∀j, j
′ ∈ {L,U,H}
(1− pj)vL1 + p
jvj2 ≥ (1− p
j)v01 + p
jv02 ∀j ∈ {L,U,H}
As this maximization problem can be analyzed as a standard problem, we will
assume that the participation constraint of the L-type, and incentive constraints
for the U -type with respect to the L-type contract and the H-type with respect
to the U -type contract bind and that all other constraints are slack. We can
rewrite the L-type participation constraint as
vL2 = s(v
L
1 ) ≡ v
0
2 +
1− pL
pL
(v01 − v
L
1 ) (5.1)
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Similarly, the U -type incentive constraint can be transformed to
vU2 = t(v
L
1 , v
U
1 ) ≡ v
0
2 +
1− pL
pL
(v01 − v
L
1 ) +
1− pU
pU
(vL1 − v
U
1 ) (5.2)
Finally, the H-type incentive constraint can be written as
vH2 = k(v
L
1 , v
U
1 , v
H
1 ) ≡ t(v
L
1 , v
U
1 ) +
1− pH
pH
(vU1 − v
H
1 ) (5.3)
We can now rewrite the monopolist’s maximization problem as the following
reduced unconstrained problem:
max
vL
1
,vH
1
,vU
1
(1− β)
[
w − pU l − (1− pU)z(vU1 )− p
Uz(t(vL1 , v
U
1 ))
]
+
β
[
γ(w − pH l − (1− pH)z(vH1 )− p
Hz(k(vL1 , v
U
1 , v
H
1 )))+
(1− γ)(w − pLl − (1− pL)z(vL1 )− p
Lz(s(vL1 )))
Then, whenever all three types buy insurance, optimal contracts are character-
ized by:
v∗H1 = v
∗H
2 (5.4)
γ
1
v′(z(v∗H2 ))
=
(1− β)
β
(1− pU)pU
pH − pU
[
1
v′(z(v∗U1 ))
−
1
v′(z(v∗U2 ))
]
(5.5)
γ
pH
pU
1
v′(z(v∗H2 ))
+
(1− β)
β
1
v′(z(v∗U2 ))
= (1− γ)
(1− pL)pL
pU − pL
[
1
v′(z(v∗L1 ))
−
1
v′(z(v∗L2 ))
]
(5.6)
and (5.1)-(5.3). An example for the optimal contracts is shown below in Figure
5.4. Note that in Figure 5.4 the optimal H-type contract is such that H-types
are cross-subsidized. As cross-subsidization drives our results on collusive stabil-
ity, we want to analyze when cross-subsidization occurs if there are uninformed
consumers and how cross-subsidization changes with the share in uninformed
consumers. Let us first consider the extreme cases of either perfect or no con-
sumer information. First assume β = 1, i.e. there are only informed customers.
This corresponds to the two-type case analyzed in the previous section and there
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w2
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Figure 5.4: Monopoly contracts when all three types buy insurance
is cross-subsidization of H-types if γ < γˆ. We let γˆ ≡ γˆ(1). Now consider β = 0,
i.e. there are only uninformed customers. The optimal contract is pinned down
by
v∗U1 = v
∗U
2
v∗U1 = (γp
H + (1− γ)pL)v02 + (1− (γp
H + (1− γ)pL))v01
Then, as the share of H-types in the whole population impacts the slope of
U -type indifference curves, we can determine the share of H-types such that the
optimal U -type contract for β = 0 corresponds to theH-type Rothschild-Stiglitz
contract. This share is denoted as γˆ(0) and given by
γˆ(0) ≡
uL(0, 0)− v(w − pH l)
(pH − pL)(v01 − v
0
2)
Note that γˆ(0) < 1 due to concavity of v. Note also that, under Assumption 1,
uL(0, 0)− v(w − pH l) > 0 and hence γˆ(0) > 0. Now since
dv∗U1
dγ
∣∣∣∣β=0 = dv∗U1dγ ∣∣β=0 = (pL − pH)(v01 − v02) < 0
increasing β at β = 0 implies that H-types will be cross-subsidized for β greater
but sufficiently close to 0 if γ < γˆ(0). This is because if there are only a few
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high risk types, the optimal U -type contract is still close to the U -type contract
for β = 0 such that the corresponding incentive compatible H-type contract is
loss-making. In our example, γˆ(0) = 0.795 such that even for a relatively large
share of H-types in the overall population there is cross-subsidization if there
are only a few informed customers.
In a similar manner, when all three types buy insurance, we can determine a
critical γ(β) such that the optimal H-type contract corresponds to the H-type
Rothschild-Stiglitz contract, denoted by γˆ(β). From (5.3) and (5.4), define
v∗U1
∣∣∣∣v∗H1 =v(w−pH l) = pUpH − pU (pH(v02 + 1− pLpL v01)− v(w − pH l)− pH(pU − pL)pUpL v∗L1 )
≡ f γˆ(v∗L1 ) (5.7)
and tγˆ(v∗L1 ) ≡ t(v
∗L
1 , f
γˆ(v∗L1 )) (5.8)
Then, rewriting (5.5) and (5.6), γˆ(β) (and v∗L1 ) is implicitly given by the solution
to the following system of equations:
pU = γˆ(β)pH + (1− γˆ(β))pL
γˆ(β)z′(v(w − pH l)) =
(1− β)
β
(1− pU)pU
pH − pU
[
z′(f γˆ(v∗L1 ))− z
′(tγˆ(v∗L1 ))
]
γˆ(β)
1− γˆ(β)
pH
pU
z′(v(w − pH l)) +
(1− β)
β(1− γˆ)
z′(tγˆ(v∗L1 )) =
(1− pL)pL
pU − pL
[
z′(v∗L1 )− z
′(s(v∗L1 ))
]
and (5.7)-(5.8). The above equations give the critical share of high risks in the
population for a given share of informed customers when parameters are such
that all three types buy insurance. Note that, if β is small and γ large, optimal
contracts will be such that L-types do not receive insurance, however, under
Assumption 1 H-types will be cross-subsidized for small values of β even if L-
types do not receive insurance. Thus, even if not all three types buy insurance,
there is a critical share of high risks such that there is cross-subsidization. With
a slight abuse of notation, we will denote this critical share for every 0 < β < 1
by γˆ(β). We illustrate γˆ(β) for our example derived from numerical analysis in
Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: γˆ(β).
From the previous section γˆ(1) = 0.15920. Note that γˆ(β) decreases in β. This
is because for low values of β, U -types are important for profit-maximization
and hence if optimal contracts are such that there is (hypothetical) cross-
subsidization for β = 0, then if there are only a few informed types there
will be cross-subsidization even if the share of high risks is fairly high. With an
increase in informed consumers, the shares of high and low risks are increasingly
important such that now for cross-subsidization to occur, the share of high risks
needs to be lowered in order for the monopolist to be willing to cross-subsidize
them to extract profit from low risks.
Deviation profits
Under symmetric information, as each contract from perfect collusion is sepa-
rately profit-making for any (γ, β) ∈ [0, 1]2, as in the two-type case a deviator
would slightly undercut each monopoly contract separately and earn monopoly
profits by deviating. Hence, independent of the share of informed customers,
we have piDs (γ, β) = 2pi
C
s (γ, β) for all (γ, β) ∈ [0, 1]
2.
Under asymmetric information, a deviator only offers those contracts that yield
positive profits and does not offer cross-subsidized contracts. Since from the
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above analysis at least H-types might be cross subsidized for some (γ, β) ∈
[0, 1]2, there exist (γ, β) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that piDas(γ, β) > 2pi
C
as(γ, β). We also
have piDas(γ, 0) = 2pi
C
as(γ, 0) for all γ ∈ [0, 1] and, for βˆ sufficiently close to
0, piDas(γ, βˆ) > 2pi
C
as(γ, βˆ) for γ < γˆ(0). Furthermore, from the previous section,
piDas(γ, 1) = 2pi
C
as(γ, 1) for all γ ∈ [γˆ, 1] and pi
D
as(γ, 1) > 2pi
C
as(γ, 1) for all γ ∈ [0, γˆ).
Stability of collusion
Since under symmetric information piDs (γ, β) = 2pi
C
s (γ, β) for all (γ, β) ∈ [0, 1]
2
and punishment profits are zero, it follows that collusion at maximal profits can
be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium for all (γ, β) ∈ [0, 1]2 if and only
if δ ∈ [1/2, 1].
Under asymmetric information, if β = 0, collusion at maximal profits can be sus-
tained as a subgame perfect equilibrium for all γ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if δ ∈ [1/2, 1].
Now for βˆ sufficiently close to 0, collusion at maximal profits can be sustained
as a subgame perfect equilibrium for all γ ∈ [γˆ(0), 1] if and only if δ ∈ [1/2, 1]
and for all γ ∈ [0, γˆ(0)) if and only if δ ∈ (δ˜, 1) with δ˜ > 1/2. Combining the last
two results, we have that a marginal increase in β from no informed consumers
to some informed consumers always destabilizes collusion as long as γ < γˆ(0).
For other values of β, the impact of an increase of β on collusive stability is
nonmonotonous. We will discuss δ¯(β) for different γ for our example.
First consider γ = 0.1. Figure 5.6 shows δ¯(β) obtained from numerical analysis
for γ = 0.1. For low values of β, δ¯(β) increases as the loss on H-types increases
since the monopolist wants to extract a large surplus from U -types. Further-
more, for low values of β, the L-type does not receive insurance. For higher
values of β, H-types are still cross-subsidized, but the overall loss on them de-
creases such that δ¯(β) decreases slightly. For even higher values of β, since γ is
low, now for profit maximization the profit from L-types become increasingly
important such that now H-types are increasingly cross-subsidized to extract
profits from L-types instead of U -types and δ¯(β) increases again.
Now consider γ = 0.15. Figure 5.7 shows δ¯(β) obtained from numerical analysis
for this case. The analysis for low and intermediate values of β is the same
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Figure 5.6: δ¯(β) for γ = 0.1
as for γ = 0.1. However, for higher values of β, the critical discount factor
now decreases. This is because as the share of high risks is sufficiently high,
profit-maximization requires that although there is still cross-subsidization of
high risks, it decreases in the share of informed consumers.
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Figure 5.7: δ¯(β) for γ = 0.15
The last examples is an even higher share of high risks with γ = 0.2. Figure
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5.8 shows δ¯(β) obtained from numerical analysis for this case. Now as the
share of high risks is substantial, high risks will not be cross-subsidized any
more if uninformed consumers become unimportant as now profit-maximization
requires a large surplus to be extracted from high risks.
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Figure 5.8: δ¯(β) for γ = 0.2
We can summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2 Consumer information about risk type does not affect collu-
sive stability under symmetric information. Under asymmetric information,
the impact of information on collusive stability is nonmonotonous. If there are
only uninformed consumers and the share of high risks is not too high, some
information about risk type always destabilizes collusion.
Proof Follows immediately from comparison of the critical discount factors.
We have analyzed the impact of consumer information on collusive stability
under the assumption that insurers neither know risk type of informed con-
sumers, nor know whether a consumer is informed, i.e. insurers cannot observe
informational status. Note that, if e.g. in the case of genetic tests, insurers
know whether a test has been taken or not, the analysis is similar to the two-
type from the previous section as uninformed consumers would always obtain
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the profit-making contract that extracts their risk premium and the adverse
selection problem remains only for informed types.
5.5 Demand shocks: Volatile risk composition
In the last section, we considered the impact of different demand conditions
in terms of the share of consumers that have precise information about their
risk type on collusive stability. We will now consider an insurance market in
which consumers are again perfectly informed about their risk type, however,
there might be intertemporal shocks to demand in the form of a volatile risk
composition of customers.
Consider the following change in the model: There are again only two types of
customers, H-types and L-types. In each period, with probability σ the share
of high risks in period t is γ¯, and with probability 1 − σ, the share is γ
¯
with
0 ≤ γ
¯
< γ¯ ≤ 1.50 We assume that σ is common knowledge. Furthermore,
in the beginning of each period before setting contracts, all firms observe the
realization of γ.51 There are no deviation incentives for an individual firm, if
piC(γ)+
δ
1− δ
(σpiC(γ¯)+(1−σ)piC(γ
¯
)) ≥ piD(γ)⇔ δ ≥
1
1 +
σpiC(γ¯)+(1−σ)piC(γ
¯
)
piD(γ)−piC(γ)
=: δ¯(γ)
We start again with symmetric information. Under symmetric information,
since for all γ each collusive contract is separately profit-making, deviation profit
always equals total collusive profits. Then deviation incentives only depend on
the ratio between the period collusive profit and the average collusive profit.
For γ
¯
= γ¯, δ¯s(γ
¯
) = δ¯s(γ¯) =
1
2
. Now fix γ
¯
and consider an increase in γ¯:
sgn
(
∂δ¯s(γ¯)
∂γ¯
)
= sgn
(
∂piCs (γ¯)
∂γ¯
)
∀γ¯ ∈ [γ
¯
, 1]
and
50 Hence, the demand shocks are iid and we do not consider correlation of demand shocks.
51 We thus model demand shocks in the spirit of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and do not
introduce imperfect monitoring as in Green and Porter (1984).
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sgn
(
∂δ¯s(γ
¯
)
∂γ¯
)
= −sgn
(
∂piCs (γ¯)
∂γ¯
)
∀γ¯ ∈ [γ
¯
, 1]
It follows that for piC(0) < piC(1) which is equivalent to rL < rH ,
δ¯s(γ
¯
) <
1
2
< δ¯s(γ¯) for 0 ≤ γ
¯
< γ¯ ≤ 1.
Note that this corresponds to the destabilizing demand boom effect in Rotem-
berg and Saloner (1986) and the subsequent literature: If piC(0) < piC(1), then
a high share of high risk types implies high demand as they have the larger
risk premium. From analogical reasoning, it follows that for piC(0) > piC(1),
δ¯s(γ
¯
) > 1
2
> δ¯s(γ¯) for 0 ≤ γ
¯
< γ¯ ≤ 1.
We now turn to the asymmetric information setting. Under asymmetric infor-
mation, deviation profits might be higher than total collusive profits leading to
a higher critical discount factor, as shown in section 3. We will refer to this as
the cream-skimming effect. What is however more relevant for the analysis of
volatile risk type shares is that collusive profits first decrease and then increase
in the share of high risks. Let piMas denote monopoly profits under asymmetric
information. Note that piMas is continuously differentiable w.r.t γ.
Lemma 5.1 ∂piMas/∂γ < 0 ∀γ < γˇ and ∂pi
M
as/∂γ > 0 ∀γ > γˇ with γˆ < γˇ < γ˜
where γ˜ is the share of high risks such that for γ ≥ γ˜, ωLM,as = (0, 0).
Proof See Appendix. 
Figure 5.9 shows monopoly profits under symmetric and asymmetric informa-
tion. In our example, γˆ ≈ 0.15920, γˇ ≈ 0.16496 and γ˜ ≈ 0.19032. As collusive
profits first decrease and then increase in the share of high risks and because
the cream-skimming effect might be relevant, the analysis for the asymmetric
information setting depends on which parameter ranges γ
¯
and γ¯ are drawn from.
We will discuss basic cases and assume that piC(0) < piC(1).
82 Chapter 5
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
γ
0 1
Figure 5.9: Monopoly and deviation profits under symmetric and asymmetric
information.
Case 1 : γ˜ < γ
¯
< γ¯
This is the case in which, under asymmetric information, in both demand states
low risks will not receive insurance. Collusive and deviation contracts coincide
and ∂piMas/∂γ = r
H > rH − rL = ∂piMs /∂γ. Then, from analogous reasoning as
above under symmetric information, it follows that δ¯as(γ
¯
) < δ¯as(γ¯) and
δ¯as(γ
¯
) < δ¯s(γ
¯
) < δ¯s(γ¯) < δ¯as(γ¯) for γ˜ < γ
¯
< γ¯ ≤ 1.
Here, the standard demand boom effect is at work both for symmetric and asym-
metric information, however, although absolute profits are lower under asym-
metric information, the relative demand boom effect is stronger under asym-
metric information as low risks do not receive insurance anyways.
Case 2: γ
¯
< γ¯ < γˇ
Contrary to Case 1, now for both possible realizations of γ the share of low risks
is high and the cream-skimming effect can occur. What is interesting is that
under asymmetric information there exist γ
¯
and γ¯ such that δ¯as(γ¯) < δ¯as(γ
¯
).
This is particularly easy to see when γ
¯
< γˆ and γˆ < γ¯ as firstly collusive profits
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decrease in γ and secondly there is no cream-skimmming effect on δ¯as(γ¯), but
on δ¯as(γ
¯
). This is interesting as although γ¯ implies a higher share of consumers
with a higher willingness to pay, colluding firms and consequently a deviator
cannot exploit the overall higher willingness to pay due to asymmetric infor-
mation and actually realize a low profit such that the critical discount factor is
lower.
Case 3: γ
¯
< γˇ < γ¯
In this case, collusive profits monotonically decrease in the region where γ
¯
is
drawn from and monotonically increase in the region where γ¯ is drawn from.
Assume first that γˆ < γ
¯
such that the cream-skimming effect is not present.
Since collusive profits decrease for γ < γˇ and increase for γ > γˇ, for a γ
¯
there exist a γ¯ such that piCas(γ
¯
) = piCas(γ¯) = σpi
C
as(γ¯) + (1 − σ)pi
C
as(γ
¯
) and thus
δ¯as(γ
¯
) = δ¯as(γ¯) = 1/2. Then, since under symmetric information, δ¯s(γ
¯
) < 1
2
<
δ¯s(γ¯) for 0 ≤ γ
¯
< γ¯ ≤ 1, there exist γ
¯
and γ¯ such that
δ¯s(γ
¯
) < δ¯as(γ
¯
) S δ¯as(γ¯) < δ¯s(γ¯)
i.e. the highest critical discount factor pertains to symmetric information. Now
consider γ
¯
< γˆ such that the cream-skimming effect destabilizing collusion under
asymmetric information is present for γ
¯
6= 0. However, assume for the moment
that γ
¯
= 0. Then, from an analogical reasoning as above and since piC(0) <
piC(1), there exists a γ¯0 < 1 such that pi
C
as(0) = pi
C
as(γ¯0) and thus δ¯as(0) =
δ¯as(γ¯0) = 1/2. Then although
sgn
(
∂δ¯as(γ¯0)
∂γ
¯
)
= −sgn
(
∂piCas(γ
¯
)
∂γ
¯
)
> 0 ∀γ
¯
∈ [0, γˇ)
and
sgn
(
∂δ¯s(γ
¯
)
∂γ
¯
)
= sgn
[
A
∂piDas(γ
¯
)
∂γ
¯
−
∂piCas(γ
¯
)
∂γ
¯
[A+ (1− σ)(piDas(γ
¯
)− piCas(γ
¯
))]
]
> 0 ∀γ
¯
∈ [0, γˆ)
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i.e. although under asymmetric information both critical discount factors in-
crease in γ
¯
, as long as γ
¯
is sufficiently close to 0, it holds that δ¯s(γ
¯
) < δ¯as(γ
¯
) ⋚
δ¯as(γ¯0) < δ¯s(γ¯). Hence, although the cream-skimming effect destabilizing col-
lusion under asymmetric information, for certain parameter ranges the demand
boom effect under symmetric information dominates such that the highest crit-
ical discount factor pertains to symmetric information.
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Figure 5.10: γ
¯
= 0.02, σ = 1/4.
Figure 5.10 shows for γ
¯
= 0.02 where the cream-skimming effect is present the
critical discount factors for γ¯ ≥ 0.02. The solid black (grey) curve depicts δ¯(γ¯)
under asymmetric (symmetric) information, and the dotted black (grey) curve
depicts δ¯(γ
¯
) under asymmetric (symmetric) information. As was shown, the
critical discount factors under symmetric information monotonically increase
respectively decrease. Furthermore, it can be seen that for a range of γ¯ > γˇ,
the highest critical discount factor is δ¯s(γ¯). This requires in particular for γ¯
to be sufficiently but not too high as otherwise the demand boom effect under
asymmetric information would dominate. Note also that Case 2 is illustrated,
as δ¯as(γ¯) < δ¯as(γ
¯
) for γ¯ sufficiently close to γˇ.
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We can now summarize our findings. First, when the risk composition is volatile
over time, collusion under asymmetric information is not always less stable than
collusion under symmetric information:
Proposition 5.3 If the risk composition is volatile, collusion under asymmetric
information might be more stable than collusion under symmetric information.
Proof Follows immediately from comparison of the critical discount factors.
Note that this result is a consequence of asymmetric information per se and does
not, contrary to the result with a constant risk composition, pertain to common
values: Due to asymmetric information, collusive profits are nonmonotonous
in the share of high risk types. Then under asymmetric information a change
in the share of risk types might not change collusive profits strongly such that
collusion is more stable.
We can furthermore relate our results to the literature on whether collusion
breaks down in boom or bust phases. We will thereby define a boom phase by
a period with a high share of costumers with high willingness to pay, i.e. if
rH > rL, a boom phase is a period with high γ.
Proposition 5.4 Under asymmetric information, collusion might break down
(require prices to be lowered) in bust phases.
Proof Follows immediately from comparison of the critical discount factors.
The second result is interesting as we analyze a Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
set-up which does not involve any imperfect monitoring of competitors’ actions.
The result follows again from asymmetric information as although a higher
share of customers with a higher willingness to pay would increase profits under
symmetric information, incentive compatibility constraints prevent firms from
exploiting the demand boom under asymmetric information such that collusive
and consequently deviating profits are higher when the share of customers with
a higher willingness to pay is low.
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5.6 Conclusion
We study the ability of firms to sustain collusive agreements in insurance mar-
kets with adverse selection. In particular, we analyze whether collusion is more
stable under symmetric or asymmetric information. It is shown that asymmetric
information destabilizes collusive agreements, however this is not a consequence
of asymmetric information per se but due to the fact that the customers’ pri-
vate information about risk types impacts an insurers profit from a particular
contract: Since even a monopolist might want to cross-subsidize high risks a
deviator can earn higher than total collusive profits which destabilizes collu-
sive agreements. In terms of the industrial organization literature, we can thus
contribute a new factor that destabilizes collusion: pay-off relevant private in-
formation.
Furthermore, we show that the impact of consumer information about risk type
has a nonmonotonous effect on collusive stability. This is an interesting result
as more consumer information about market parameters is typically assumed to
deter collusion.
In this chapter, we only analyze the market with two respectively three cus-
tomer types and consider the extreme cases of either complete symmetric or
asymmetric information. One extension would be to conduct the analysis for
more general type distributions. Furthermore, an interesting extension would
be to consider a model where instead of either symmetric or asymmetric infor-
mation firms receive a signal about a customer’s risk type with varying precision
such that more detailed comparative statics results can be derived.
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5.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
From the envelope theorem, we have:
∂piMAS(γ)/∂γ = (w − p
H l − (1− pH)z(v∗H1 (γ))− p
Hz(v∗H2 (γ)))
− (w − pLl − (1− pL)z(v∗L1 (γ))− p
Lz(v∗L2 (γ))) (5.9)
Rewriting (15) by substituting:
v∗L2 = v
0
2 +
1− pL
pL
(v01 − v
∗L
1 ) ≡ a(v
∗L
1 ) (5.10)
v∗H1 = v
∗H
2 = p
H(v02 +
1− pL
pL
(v01) +
pL − pH
pLpH
v∗L1 ) ≡ k(v
∗L
1 ) (5.11)
from (2) and the binding constraints, we get
∂piMAS(γ)/∂γ = (w − p
H l − z(k(v∗L1 (γ))))−
(w − pLl − (1− pL)z(v∗L1 (γ))− p
Lz(a(v∗L1 (γ))) (5.12)
Substituting (19) and (20) into (3), we have:
z′(k(v∗L1 ))−
1− γ
γ
pL(1− pL)
pH − pL
(z′(v∗L1 )− z
′(a(v∗L1 )) = 0 ≡ F (γ, v
∗L
1 ) (5.13)
Then, from the implicit function theorem:
∂v∗L1 /∂γ = −
∂F (γ, v∗L1 )/∂γ
∂F (γ, v∗L1 )/∂v
∗L
1
(5.14)
with
∂F (γ, v∗L1 )/∂v
∗L
1 = z
′′(k(v∗L1 ))
pH(pL − pH)
pLpH
−
1− γ
γ
pL(1− pL)
pH − pL
(z′′(v∗L1 ) + z
′′(a(v∗L1 ))(
1− pL
pL
)) < 0 (5.15)
and
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∂F (γ, v∗L1 )/∂γ =
pL(1−pL)
pH−pL
(z′(v∗L1 )− z
′(a(v∗L1 ))
γ2
> 0 (5.16)
It follows, as long as both types buy insurance, that
∂v∗L1 /∂γ > 0
Since
∂k(v∗L1 )/∂γ =
pL − pH
pL
< 0
we have ∂(w − pH l − z(k(v∗L1 (γ))))/∂γ > 0
as long as both types buy insurance. Furthermore, since
∂a(v∗L1 )/∂γ = −
1− pL
pL
< 0
we have
∂(w − pLl − (1− pL)z(v∗L1 (γ))− p
Lz(a(v∗L1 (γ)))/∂γ =
(∂v∗L1 /∂γ)(1− p
L)(z′(a(v∗L1 ))− z
′(v∗L1 )) < 0 (5.17)
as long as both types buy insurance. Now, as already shown in Stiglitz (1977),
there exists a γ˜ such that for γ < γ˜ L-types do not buy insurance. With our
approach, γ˜ is given by
γ˜
1− γ˜
=
pL(1− pL)
pH − pL
[
z′(c(v(w − pH l − r
H)))− z′(a(c(v(w − pH l − rH))))
z′(v(w − pH l − rH))
]
(5.18)
Note that γ˜ > γˆ. Furthermore, we have ∂piMAS(γ)/∂γ = r
H ∀ γ ∈ [γ˜, 1]. Then,
since (w−pH l−z(k(v∗L1 (γ)))) < 0 for all γ < γˆ and (w−p
Ll−(1−pL)z(v∗L1 (γ))−
pLz(a(v∗L1 (γ))) > 0∀ γ ∈ [0, γ˜), combining the above results gives
∂piMAS/∂γ < 0 ∀γ < γˇ
∂piMAS/∂γ > 0 ∀γ > γˇ
with γˆ < γˇ < γ˜.
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